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UNRAVELLING INVENTORSHIP
TOSHIKO TAKENAKA*
Abstract
Inventorship, who made an invention, is one of the most important concepts under the
U.S. patent system. Incorrect inventorship determinations result in patent invalidity not only
because U.S. Constitution requires granting patents to true inventors, but also first-inventorto-file novelty inherited many aspects of first-to-invent novelty which depended on
inventorship whether to include prior inventions as prior art. Correcting inventorship may
result in sharing patent exclusivity with competitors, which forfeits profits necessary to
recover expensive development costs. However, the standard to determine inventorship has
been called muddy by judges and commentators because neither the Patent Act nor case law
provide any clear guidance. The standard has become overinclusive to overcome obstacles
to obtaining patents when inventors work jointly on the same research project because the
first-to-invent system included prior inventions as prior art even if they were kept secret
(secret prior art), unless the same inventorship exception enabled inventors to remove the
prior art. To address the obstacles, Congress has introduced multiple exceptions, which have
resulted in an unnecessarily complex legal framework. Under the current standard, any
researchers who are willing to exchange research results and ideas are subjected to the risk
of a joint inventorship dispute.
This article proposes a reform to remove the obstacles which America Invents Act (AIA)
was unable to address. It proposes the adoption of a simplified legal framework which would
remove secret prior art and prior art during the grace period from obviousness determinations,
regardless of inventorship. By eliminating any necessity for the overinclusive inventorship
standard, this article proposes an improved inventorship standard to include only inventors
who collectively made inventive contributions by revitalizing the collaboration requirement
and inventive nature requirement for contributions.

*

Washington Research Foundation Professor of Technology Law, University of Washington School of Law; Professor, Keio
University Law School. The author wants to thank her research assistants, Hannah Avery and Tallman Trask, J.D. students, and
Ms. Cindy Fester, Publication Specialist at the University of Washington School of Law, for their assistance.
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UNRAVELLING INVENTORSHIP
TOSHIKO TAKENAKA*

INTRODUCTION

Moderna is currently under fire for allegedly failing to name
researchers from the National Institute of Health (NIH) in its COVID19 vaccine patents.1 Did Moderna intentionally fail to name the NIH
researchers? To people unfamiliar with U.S. patent law, the question
of who made an invention appears to be an easy one to answer.
However, the more familiar you are with U.S. case law, the more
confusing and difficult this question becomes. The concept used by
U.S. courts and the Patent Office to determine who made an invention
is known as inventorship. Both judges and patent law commentators
call the inventorship standard muddy because neither the Patent Act
nor the case law give any clear guidance on how to decide
inventorship.2 Not only is the statutory definition of joint inventions
vague, its interpretation under the case law is also unclear because
courts tend to emphasize the fact-specific nature of inventorship
disputes and refuse to develop a test applicable to all cases in which
researchers claim inventorship based on their contributions to various
steps of a research project.

*

Washington Research Foundation Professor of Technology Law, University of Washington School of
Law; Professor, Keio University Law School. The author wants to thank her research assistants, Hannah
Anevy and Tallman Trask, J.D. students, and Ms. Cindy Fester, Publication Specialist at the University
of Washington School of Law, for their assistance, as well as Professor Xuan-Thao Nguyen for their
invaluable comments on drafts of this paper.
1. Jorge L. Contreras, Will NIH Learn from Myriad When Settling Its mRNA Inventorship Dispute
with Moderna? BILL OF HEALTH (Jan. 6, 2022), https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2022/01/06/nihmoderna-mrna-covid-vaccine-patent/ [https://perma.cc/9TQQ-N98E].
2. A district court commented on the theory of inventorship: “It is one of the muddiest concepts in
the muddy metaphysics of the patent law.” Mueller Brass Co. v. Reading Indus. Inc., 352 F. Supp. 1357,
1372, 176 USPQ 361, 372 (E.D. Pa. 1972), aff’d, 487 F.2d 1395 (3d Cir. 1973); 2 DONALD S. CHISUM,
CHISUM ON PATENTS, § 2.02[2] (2022). See also, W. Fritz Fasse, The Muddy Metaphysics of Joint
Inventorship: Cleaning Up After the 1984 Amendments to 35 U.S.C. § 116, 5 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 153,
159 (1992) [hereinafter Fasse, Muddy Metaphysics].
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In the biopharmaceutical industry, answering the question of
who made a drug or therapy is particularly challenging because many
researchers from different stakeholders are involved in the
development process. Often, these researchers change their
employers, moving from one stakeholder to another.3 Many
researchers practice open science by sharing ideas, data, and materials
while competing for obtaining patents.4
Dissecting such an inventive process is almost impossible
because stakeholders engage in open innovation which traverses the
blurred line between science and technology. Their research activities
include both pre-invention contribution, such as discoveries of laws of
nature which have not been applied to a therapeutic use, and postinvention contributions, including experimentation to confirm the
efficacy of a therapy. A recent case from the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”), Dana-Farber v. Ono (2021),
highlights this difficulty.5 In Dana-Farber, a Harvard professor and
his colleague, a former employee of the Genetics Institute, fought
bitterly against Dr. Tasuku Honjo, a professor at Kyoto University,
over inventorship of a cancer therapy that uses PD-1 immune
checkpoint inhibitors. The therapy is based on Dr. Honjo’s
groundbreaking discoveries of cancer immunology, which led to an
award of the 2018 Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine.6 Despite no
active communication between the U.S. and Japanese researchers
demonstrating completion of the claimed cancer therapy prior to the
conception of the invention and U.S. researchers’ lack of knowledge
on the completed therapy, the Federal Circuit found sufficient
collaboration to award the U.S. researchers joint inventorship based
on regular meetings to exchange research ideas and data. Thus, joint
inventorship may unlimitedly include any researchers who made a
discovery long before the completion of an invention if the discovery
3. Courtney Chandler, Climbing The Research Ladder in Industry, ASBMB TODAY (June 25,
2021), https://www.asbmb.org/asbmb-today/careers/062521/climbing-the-research-ladder-in-industry
[https://perma.cc/3A84-QCH3].
4. The policymakers in the U.S. and EU adopted open science as a policy priority. U.S. Open
Government Initiatives, USA.GOV, https://open.usa.gov/ [https://perma.cc/M87X-ANL4]; Open Science:
The EU’s Open Science Policy, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, https://ec.europa.eu/info/research-andinnovation/strategy/strategy-2020-2024/our-digital-future/open-science_en (last visited Apr. 13, 2022)
[https://perma.cc/HG6T-25WX].
5. Dana-Farber Cancer Inst., Inc. v. Ono Pharm. Co., 964 F.3d 1365, 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2020),
cert. denied, Ono Pharm. Co. v. Dana-Farber Cancer Inst., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 2691 (2021). The case is
analyzed in Part I, B.
6. Tasuku Honjo, The Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine 2018: Tasuku Honjo - Facts, THE
NOBEL PRIZE, https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/medicine/2018/honjo/facts/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2022)
[https://perma.cc/LYU4-BWJ4].
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contributes to the invention because the court in Dana-Farber credited
such a discovery to joint inventorship, even though the discovery was
made before the researcher began to share his research and data with
Dr. Honjo and other named inventors. The inventorship standard that
the Federal Circuit applied is too easy to attain and thus any researcher
who exchanges research ideas and data may qualify for joint
inventorship if any of researchers who received the idea and data
complete an invention. In short, the current inventorship standard
exposes researchers in the biopharmaceutical industry to a high risk of
inventorship disputes.
Correcting inventorship is not just about giving scientific credit.
It is the lifeline for pharmaceutical firms to secure reasonable profits
through exclusivity in order to cover the huge costs of new drug and
therapy development.7 Regarding patents on the COVID-19 vaccine,
it is also matter of public interest because U.S. taxpayers have funded
the vaccine developments.8 Adding the NIH researchers on the vaccine
patents would result in Moderna sharing its patent rights with the U.S.
Federal Government, which can freely license the patents to
Moderna’s competitors. Because of patent exclusivity, the vaccine
brought more than $7.3 billion in profits to Moderna in 2021.9
Competition with NIH’s licensees would significantly lower
Moderna’s profits and make the cost paid by taxpayers more
affordable. Likewise, in Dana-Farber, adding the Harvard professor
as an inventor on the immune checkpoint cancer therapy patents
enabled his employer, Dana-Farber Cancer Institute, to license the
technology to many stakeholders seeking to develop drugs and
therapies for a variety of cancers. Dr. Honjo’s patent assignee, Ono
Pharmaceutical Co., and its exclusive licensees can no longer
exclusively enjoy profits from the check point inhibitor market. For
context, the check point inhibitor market—in which Ono holds the

7. A study shows that developing a new drug is estimated to cost 2.6 billion for a pharmaceutical
firm. Thomas Sullivan, A Tough Road: Cost to Develop One New Drug is $2.6 Billion; Approval Rate
for Drugs Entering Clinical Development is Less Than 12%, POL’Y & MED.
https://www.policymed.com/2014/12/a-tough-road-cost-to-develop-one-new-drug-is-26-billionapproval-rate-for-drugs-entering-clinical-de.html (Mar. 21, 2019) [https://perma.cc/F3GU-KGBP].
8. Richard G. Frank et. al., It was the Government that Produced COVID-19 Vaccine Success,
HEALTH
AFFS.
FOREFRONT
(May
14,
2021)
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/forefront.20210512.191448/ [https://perma.cc/ZU3X-ZF2P].
9. Michael Hiltzik, Raking in Profits, Moderna Denies Government Scientists Credit for the
COVID Vaccine, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2021, 11:55 AM) https://www.latimes.com/business/story/202111-30/moderna-denies-government-scientists-credit-for-inventing-covid-vaccine
[https://perma.cc/6DB9-5JUS].
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largest share—is projected to grow from $15.29 billion in 2020 to
$18.04 billion in 2021 and may reach 39.81 billion in 2025.10
Once an inventorship error is found, the patent is invalid unless
it is corrected. Because the U.S. Constitution instructs Congress to
grant inventors exclusive right to their respective inventions, only
original and true inventors are entitled to obtain valid patents. In
addition to implications resulting from shared exclusivity, correcting
inventorship may invalidate patents because inventorship is relevant
to patentability.11
The U.S. patent system is unique in making the availability of
prior art relevant to inventorship: a prior invention is removed from
the prior art when the subject matter disclosed in both the prior art and
the claimed invention under examination are made by the same
inventor. This common inventorship exception originated from the
first-to-invent system that the U.S. followed until the enactment of the
American Invent Act (AIA) which took effect in 2012.12 This
exception applies to joint inventions only if the disclosed subject
matter and the claimed invention were made by the same inventive
entity, which requires identical joint inventors as a group.13 Adding or
deleting a joint inventor on a patent would result in different inventive
entities which would introduce additional prior art and invalidate the
patent. Secret prior art, which also originated from the first-to-invent
system, provided an obstacle to obtaining patents when inventors work
jointly on the same research project. Because prior inventions were
prior art even if they are kept secret, inventors’ own prior inventions
and knowledge of their research teammates’ prior inventions
effectively prevented the patenting of inventions resulting from the
same research project because they are closely related and frequently
obvious in light of each other.
To remove this obstacle, courts developed today’s overinclusive
inventorship standard which enables removing secret prior arts

10. Global Checkpoint Inhibitors Market (2021 to 2030) - Featuring AstraZeneca, Roche Holding
and
Pfizer
Among
Others,
GLOBAL NEWSWIRE
(Dec.
07,
2021
6:58
PM)
https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2021/12/07/2347238/28124/en/Global-CheckpointInhibitors-Market-2021-to-2030-Featuring-AstraZeneca-Roche-Holding-and-Pfizer-AmongOthers.html [https://perma.cc/8NPC-N8ME].
11. See discussion infra Part II. A. 1.
12. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). The provisions to shift
from the first-to-invent system took effect on March 16, 2013. See infra note 265 and accompanying text.
13. The inventive entity doctrine is further discussed in context of the first-to-invent novelty. See
infra Part II. A.
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through the common inventorship exception.14 Congress also added
two more exceptions overlapping with the common inventorship
exception, which resulted in a complex legal framework. Despite the
AIA’s adoption of the First-Inventor-To-File (FITF) novelty, the U.S.
patent system retained (1) the first-to-invent feature that deems
inventorship relevant to availability of prior art and (2) the complex
legal framework to address the problems caused by secret prior art,
which the AIA should have removed completely.
Thus, this article proposes a reform to simplify the legal
framework by completely removing secret prior art from the novelty
and nonobviousness determination, which will eliminate any necessity
for the multiple exceptions and the overinclusive inventorship
standard. Moreover, the proposed reform increases legal certainty in
patent protection by making availability of prior art irrelevant to
inventorship. Because the overinclusive standard would no longer be
necessary, this article reinvents an inventorship standard by
revitalizing the collaboration requirement and inventive nature
requirement for contributions.
This article includes three parts. Part I discusses the unique
features of biopharmaceutical inventions resulting from open
innovation engaged in by researchers from different stakeholders, and
challenges in identifying the completion of an invention and dissecting
the inventive process of the invention to identify inventors. To
highlight the challenges, Part I examines the inventorship dispute in
Dana Farber as a real-life example.
Part II discusses pre-AIA legislation and case law on
inventorship and examines the root of the current inclusive standard.
Because the Patent Law Amendment of 1984 introduced the current
definition of joint invention, Part II is divided into pre-1984
inventorship and post-1984 inventorship. The pre-1984 section
reviews (1) the originality requirement which ensures correct
inventorship and its close relationship with the first-to-invent novelty,
(2) the restrictive inventorship standard developed by courts, and (3)
the important role played by the common inventorship exception. The
post-1984 section reviews (1) the statutory inventorship standard and
(2) the common ownership and joint research agreement exceptions
introduced in the 1984 Amendment and the 2004 CREATE Act.
14. Part II also includes an in-depth review of the current inventorship under the Federal Circuit
Case. See infra Part II. B.
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Part III examines impact of FITF novelty on inventorship and
finds that some types of secret prior art remained in the U.S. patent
system contrary to congressional intent. To completely remove secret
prior art, the FITF novelty provision should be revised to limit
availability of prior art for the purpose of novelty only if a) prior art is
a) the subject matter which was publicly available on the filing date of
the claimed invention or b) the subject matter which is covered by the
exceptions as disclosures within one year from the filing date. With
complete removal of secret prior art, the inventorship standard would
be reinvented to effectively protect researchers from a risk of
inventorship dispute and promote open science practices by
effectively excluding those who joined a collective effort to complete
the invention but failed to make an inventive contribution.
I.

Cumulative Innovation: Biopharmaceutical Industry
A. Uniqueness of Biopharmaceutical Inventions

The United States Constitution gives inventors the exclusive
right to their inventions for a limited time, which plays a key role in
promoting the useful arts.15 Congress developed the United States’
patent system based on the utilitarian theory that presumes inventors
are able to recoup investment costs and obtain profits by selling their
products or services at supra-competitive prices during the temporary
period of exclusivity.16 This inventor-centric reward theory was based
on the traditional innovation theory advanced by Joseph Shumpeter,17
and presumed a closed innovation model where inventors invent,
commercialize and market a new product by engaging in every stage
of the value chain.18 The traditional model was developed with a
presumption to promote stand-alone innovation rather than follow-on
innovation, i.e., inventions through improvement and refinement.19

15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
16. See FRANÇOIS LÉVÊQUE & YANN MÉNIÈRE, THE ECONOMICS OF PATENTS AND COPYRIGHT 1,
5, 20, 27 (2004) (discussing the basic economics of patent protection and reward,),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=642622.
17. See generally, JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: AN
INQUIRY INTO PROFITS, CAPITAL, CREDIT, INTEREST, AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE (1934).
18. David J. Teece, Firm Organization, Industrial Structure, and Technological Innovation, 31 J.
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 193, 198 (1996) (“The ‘Schumpeterian’ view of the innovation processes appears
to be one that involves full integration, from research, development, manufacturing and marketing.”).
19. For the definition of “stand-alone innovation,” see Peter S. Menell & Suzanne Scotchmer,
Economic Models of Innovation: Stand-Alone and Cumulative Creativity, in 1 RSCH. HANDBOOK ON THE
ECON. OF INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 5 (Ben DePoorter & Peter S. Menell eds., 2018) [hereinafter MENELL &
SCOTCHMER, ECONOMIC MODELS]. For examples of stand-alone innovation, see RICHARD R. NELSON &
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These presumptions are mainly a reflection of innovation in the
mechanical field, which was the main industry when the very first
Patent Act was enacted in 1790.20 However, this stand-alone
innovation model was not applicable to many inventions, even those
in the mechanical field during the early era of the U.S. patent system.21
In fact, many pioneering inventions in the early era were—
independently and simultaneously—made by multiple inventors.22
These inventions were refined and improved by follow-on innovation
through cumulative innovation.23 Just as the traditional utilitarian
theory did not apply to many inventions in the early era, it seldom
applies to current inventions.
Many legal and economics scholars have critiqued the current
patent system for failing to take account of the changes in players,
their incentives, and the innovation model.24 This author has also
criticized the system as being outdated for failing to take account of
new patent uses: using patents for sharing patented inventions and
guaranteeing the freedom to operate and innovate.25 In the postInternet era, the overwhelming majority of products and services result
from cumulative innovation, sequential inventions, and improvements
throughout value chains. Spurred by post-Internet technologies, firms
shifted from the closed innovation model to an open model by actively
seeking external resources for ideas and commercialization and
collaboration with inventors from different firms and institutions.26
This cumulative innovation leads to a thicket of interdependent and
overlapping patents held by different patent owners but covering the

SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE (1985); ERIC VON HIPPEL, THE
SOURCES OF INNOVATION (1988).
20. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (April 10, 1790).
21. Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709, 710–11, 731–33
(2012).
22. Id. at 716, 722. Many inventions viewed as pioneering, including the steam engine by James
Watt and the lightbulb by Thomas Edison, were in fact invented simultaneously and improved
incrementally.
23. See MENELL & SCOTCHMER, ECONOMIC MODELS, supra note 19, at 20–33 (discussing
cumulative innovation in contrast to stand-alone innovation).
24. E.g., Peter Lee, Social Innovation, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 26 (2014); Liza Vertinsky,
Boundary-Spanning Collaboration and the Limits of Joint Inventorship Doctrine, 55 HOUS. L.R. 401,
434–35 (2017); Katherine J. Strandburg, Intellectual Property at the Boundary, in REVOLUTIONIZING
INNOVATION: USERS, COMMUNITIES, AND OPEN INNOVATION 235, 241 (Dietmar Harhoff & Karim R.
Lakhani, eds., 2016); Yochai Benkler, Law, Innovation and Collaboration in Networked Economy and
Society, 13 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 231, 232–33 (2017).
25. Toshiko Takenaka, Patents for Sharing, 26 MICH. TECH. L.R. 93, 93 (2019) [hereinafter
Takenaka, Sharing]; Toshiko Takenaka, Inclusive Patents for Open Innovation, 29 TEX. INTELL. PROP.
L.J. 187, 187 (2021) [hereinafter Takenaka, Inclusive Patents].
26. Takenaka, Inclusive Patents, supra note 25, at 192–93.
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same product or service.27 Therefore, the traditional theory does not
apply to inventions resulting from cumulative innovation because
patent owners cannot enforce their patents, thereby excluding their
competitor and enjoying profits from the supra-competitive price,
without a risk of counter-infringement assertion.28 In contrast, instead
of incentive through monopoly profits, economic scholars focus on the
role of patent for coordinating and appropriating benefits from
patented inventions among the sequential inventors.29
Historically, the pharmaceutical industry has predominantly
engaged in closed innovation in which all R&D and
commercialization activities were conducted in-house.30 The
pharmaceutical industry has been distinct from other high-tech
industries because its products are covered by only one or a few
patents owned by a single patent owner who can enjoy monopoly
profits.31 However, as products in the industry shifted from small
molecule to biologics drugs, more and more pharmaceutical firms
sought ideas from outside collaborators, especially from universities
and academic research institutions (“universities”), and began to
embrace an open innovation model.32 Before the adoption of the open
innovation model, the innovation process in the pharmaceutical
industry was depicted as a linear model consisting of the three stages:
research, development and commercialization.33 As the
biopharmaceutical industry emerged, pharmaceutical firms simply
sought ideas and discoveries of laws of nature, such as DNA
27. Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and StandardSetting, in 1 INNOVATION POL’Y AND ECON. 119, 121 (Adam B. Jaffe et. al eds. 2001); Bronwyn H. Hall
et al., Technology Entry in The Presence of a Patent Thickets (Inst. Fiscal Studs., Working Paper No.
W16/02
2016),
https://www.ifs.org.uk/uploads/publications/wps/wp201602.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MMS9-3B47].
28. Takenaka, Sharing, supra note 25, at 115–16.
29. MENELL & SCOTCHMER, ECONOMIC MODELS, supra note 19, at 20; Suzanne Scotchmer,
Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSPS. 29,
34 (1991); Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of The Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 278
(1977).
30. Alexander Schuhmacher, Oliver Gassmann, & Markus Hinder, Changing R&D Models in
Research-Based Pharmaceutical Companies, 14 (105) J. TRANSL. MED. 1 (2016)
[https://perma.cc/GRH2-X3RB].
31. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1590,
1684–87 (2003).
32. Alexander Schuhmacher, Oliver Gassmann, Nigel McCracken, & Markus Hinder, Open
Innovation And External Sources Of Innovation. An Opportunity To Fuel The R&D Pipeline And Enhance
Decision Making?, 16 (119) J. TRANSL. MED. 1 (2018) [https://perma.cc/DA4K-KHY2].
33. Leonidas Aristodemou, Frank Tietze, Elizabeth O’Leary, & Matt Shaw, A Literature Review on
Technology Development Process (TDP) Models, (Ctr. for Tech. Mgmt., Working Paper No. 2058-8887,
2019), https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.35692 [https://perma.cc/5XZS-9DL7]; Letizia Mortara et al.,
Technology Intelligence Practice in UK Technology-Based Companies, 48 INT’L. J. TECH. MGMT. 115–
135 (2009).
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sequences, from universities through licensing.34 This early stage of
the open innovation model maintained the distinction of the roles
played by the key stakeholders, universities and pharmaceutical firms:
the former focused on creating new knowledge through basic research
and science, while the latter focused on absorbing and applying that
knowledge to practical uses and funding the universities’ basic
research.35 Ultimately, the collaboration of different stakeholders in
the linear innovation process resulted in products covered by upstream
and downstream patents owned by different patent owners, which
presented coordination challenges for conducting further research.36
One key reason the biopharmaceutical industry has become
more complex and integrated after adopting the open-innovation
model is the uniqueness of the industry, in which drug development
relies heavily on the knowledge and experience of researchers from
different stakeholders. 37 Because of this complexity and collaboration,
more and more economic scholars have adopted an ecosystem model,
rather than a linear model, to depict the innovation process as the
transition between basic research and applied technology has become
blurred, and the roles played by universities and pharmaceutical firms
have become unclear.38 Key stakeholders include not only universities
and pharmaceutical firms, but also technology startups, venture
capitalists and the government bodies which regulate drug marketing
approvals.39 Researchers from key stakeholders provide knowledge
and experience unique to their background and contribute to
discoveries and inventions in the drug innovation process. These
researchers frequently move from one stakeholder to another and

34. In the U.S., the Bayh-Dole Act was enacted to promote the academic-industry collaboration.
Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (1980).
35. Manthan D. Janodia et al., Facets of Technology Transfer: A Perspective of Pharmaceutical
Industry.
13
J.
INTELL.
PROP.
RTS.
28
(2008)
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/237740365_Facets_of_Technology_Transfer_A_Perspective_
of_Pharmaceutical_Industry [https://perma.cc/NT3N-X9JX].
36. Arti K. Rai, Fostering Cumulative Innovation in the Biopharmaceutical Industry: The Role of
Patents and Antitrust, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 813 (2001); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Collaborative
Research: Conflicts on Authorship, Ownership, and Accountability, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1159 (2000),
https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol53/iss4/2.
37. THE NEW FRONTIERS OF BIOPHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION, INT’L FED’N OF PHARM. MFR. &
ASS’NS, 18 (2012) https://www.ifpma.org/resource-centre/the-new-frontiers-of-biopharmaceuticalinnovation [https://perma.cc/XVA3-STSK] [hereinafter IFPMA NEW FRONTIER].
38. Alberto Bettanti et al., Biopharmaceutical Innovation Ecosystems: A Stakeholder Model and the
Case of Lombardy, J. TECH. TRANSFER (2021), available at https://doi.org/10.1007/s10961-021-098901 [https://perma.cc/URV9-2P7Q].
39. Id. at 12.
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collaborate to share ideas and data while competing for patent rights.40
Moreover, these researchers share their knowledge and experience
with global partners as the industry’s innovation model transforms.41
Whether such researchers should be identified as inventors requires
determining the date of completion of an invention and dissecting the
inventive act from the cumulative innovation, both of which have
become a challenging task as neither Congress nor the courts are
willing to give clear guidance.
B. Real Life Example: Dana Faber v. Ono
The challenge that researchers face in demonstrating
inventorship was highlighted in Dana Farber v. Ono (2021)42 which
involved a dispute among researchers from Kyoto University, Harvard
University and Genetics Institute, which once collaborated and shared
information of their discoveries and research results. Their
collaboration led to a break-through cancer therapeutic technique and
the award of the 2018 Nobel Prize to Dr. Tasuku Honjo, one of the
Japanese researchers and a professor at Kyoto University’s medical
school.43 The break-through technique originated from Dr. Honjo’s
discovery of PD-1, an inhibitory receptor on T cells, in the early
1990s.44 T cells play a very important role in the human body’s
immune system by coordinating the immune response to an antigen or
eliminating abnormal cells such as tumor cells.45 PD-1 causes T cells
to stop attacking the cells expressing ligands by binding to one of its
ligands: PD-L1 or PD-L2. In order to disguise themselves as healthy
cells, some tumor cells can express these ligands causing PD-1 to
signal the T cells to stop attacking the tumor cells.46 Dr. Honjo’s
treatment technique uses antibodies which bind PD-1 and block the
interaction between PD-1 and its ligand, PD-L1 or PD-L2 and prevent
the tumor cells disguised as healthy cells from stopping the T cell
attack by preventing the transmission of an inhibitive signal.47

40. Hakim Djaballah, Academic-Industry Collaboration: Intertwined for Drug Discovery, CAS
BLOG (Jan. 11, 2019) https://www.cas.org/resources/blog/academic-industry-collaboration-intertwineddrug-discovery [https://perma.cc/V6JB-GB5M].
41. IFPMA NEW FRONTIER, supra note 37, at 44.
42. Dana-Farber Cancer Inst., Inc. v. Ono Pharm. Co., 964 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
43. Id. at 1370.
44. Id. at 1368.
45. Id. at 1367.
46. See id.
47. See id.
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After Dr. Honjo isolated the DNA sequence of the PD-1
receptor, he worked with his colleagues at Kyoto University, Dr.
Nagahiro Minato and Dr. Yoshiko Iwai, to determine the function of
PD-1 through various experiments.48 Finding no success in this first
collaboration, Dr. Honjo began to work with Dr. Wood, a researcher
at Genetics Institute, to find the PD-1 ligand in September 1998.49
After Dr. Wood agreed to collaborate and received PD-1 reagents and
research results from Dr. Honjo, he became involved in a separate
project with Dr. Freeman, a professor at Harvard Medical School and
researcher at Dana-Farber Institute, who had independently found
novel ligands in July 1998, prior to the Honjo–Wood collaboration.50
While studying the ligands, Dr. Wood began to work with Dr.
Freeman and confirmed that one of the novel ligands bound with PD1.51
After Dr. Wood informed Dr. Honjo about the ligand, the three
researchers named the ligand as PD-L1 and began exchanging
information, reagents and other materials while meeting periodically.52
Among those materials were anti-PD-1 antibodies developed by the
Japanese researchers. Dr. Wood received these antibodies from Dr.
Honjo and experimented to confirm that the antibodies inhibited the
PD-1/PD-L1 interaction.53 Dr. Wood shared the experiment results,
which showed the antibodies’ inhibitive effect, with Drs. Honjo and
Freeman at a meeting in October 1999.54Around the time of the
meeting, Dr. Freeman found another ligand and conducted various
experiments.55 This ligand was labeled PD-L2 because Dr. Wood
tested to confirm that it is bound with PD-1, and PD-1, and PD-L2
interacts to inhibit the immune response.56 In March 2000, Dr.
Freeman emailed Dr. Honjo about PD-L2 and sent him its sequence.
Their collaboration was at its peak when they worked on a journal
article reporting their discoveries and research results on PD-L1.
During the editing process, Dr. Freeman—for the first time—
suggested the application of their discoveries to cancer treatment by
the addition of a sentence suggesting the possibility that tumors use
48. Id. at 1368.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. Id. at 1368.
55. See id., Dana-Farber Cancer Inst., Inc. v. Ono Pharm. Co., 379 F. Supp. 3d 53, 72-73 (D. Mass.
2019), aff’d, 964 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
56. Dana-Farber, 964 F.3d at 1369.
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PD-L1 to inhibit immune response against cancers.57 This statement
was based on his experiments which showed that PD-L1 was highly
expressed on various human tumor cells.58 At a March 27, 2000
meeting, Dr. Wood also described the therapeutic possibility of using
the PD-1/PD-L1 pathway to treat cancer.59 It is unclear when their
research moved from the basic science research to drug development.
However, by May 2000, all three researchers were keenly aware of the
possible development of a cancer treatment technique by using antiPD-L1 antibodies.60 When Dr. Freeman shared strong evidence of PDL1 expression on human tumors in September 2000, the researchers
were further convinced that they are beginning to apply their
discoveries to cancer treatments.61
In June 2000, the relationship between the U.S. and Japanese
researchers began to turn sour when Dr. Honjo learned about a
provisional application, filed by Dr. Wood and Dr. Freeman in
November 1999, that did not name Dr. Honjo as a coinventor.62 The
provisional application was premature; it inaccurately disclosed PD1’s function in the PD-1 and PD-L1 interaction as not only inhibitive,
but also stimulative.63 Nevertheless, the application matured into three
U.S. patents.64 The accurate function of PD-1 which is only inhibitory,
was confirmed in October 2000 when Dr. Iwai conducted experiments
on reagents provided by Dr. Freeman.65 This led Dr. Honjo to propose
October 27, the day that Dr. Iwai reported her experiment results, as
the conception date.66 Although the parties did not dispute the
conception date, it is likely that the three researchers worked
simultaneously and reached a conception prior to this proposed
conception date by focusing on blocking the pathway to treat
cancers.67
After the October 2000 experiment, Japanese researchers began
to focus on the development of a cancer treatment using antibodies to
block the PD-1/PD-L1 pathway and stop an immune response
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

See id.
See id.
See Dana-Farber, 379 F. Supp. 3d at 73-74.
Id. at 75.
Id. at 93.
Id. at 71.
Id.
Id.
Dana-Farber, 964 F.3d at1369.
Dana-Farber, 379 F. Supp. 3d at 76, 88.
Id. at 94.
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inhibitory signal.68 As the inventorship dispute on the provisional
application intensified, the U.S. and Japanese researchers stopped
sharing information.69 Japanese researchers continued to conduct
experimentation and collect more data on the cancer treatment until
they filed a Japanese patent application on July 3, 2002.70 The
Japanese claims were directed to a medication that treats cancer by
blocking the PD-1/PD-L1 pathway.71 The Japanese application
disclosed results of experiments on the effect of the PD-1/PD-L1
pathway beginning in 2000.72 A year later, the team filed an
international application that matured (from 2009 to 2016) into the
Honjo patents at issue.73 The Honjo patents claim various aspects of
the cancer treatment technique which administers anti PD-1 antibodies
to stimulate an immune response.74 The broadest claim of these patents
recites “a method for treatment of a tumor in a patient, comprising
administering to the patient a pharmaceutically effective amount of an
anti-PD-1 monoclonal antibody.”75 All six patents named only Dr.
Honjo, Dr. Minato, Dr. Iwai, and Mr. Shiro Shibayama, a researcher
from Ono Pharmaceutical, as inventors.76 All four named inventors
assigned their interests in the Honjo patents to Ono Pharmaceutical.
In September 2015, Dana-Farber Cancer Institute, Dr.
Freeman’s employer, filed an inventorship suit against Dr. Honjo as
well as Ono Pharmaceuticals, the assignee, and Bristol-Myer Squibb,
the licensee of Honjo patents, (collectively, “Ono”) in the District
Court for the District of Massachusetts.77 The District Court ordered
the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to add Dr.
Wood and Dr. Freeman as inventors on all Honjo patents.78 The court
found that the two U.S. researchers are coinventors because the
following contributions are significant to the conception of the
claimed inventions: (a) Dr. Wood’s and Dr. Freeman’s discovery of
68. Id. at 76.
69. Id.
70. Dana-Farber, 964 F.3d at 1369–76.
71. The district court decision misstated that they were directed to “methods of treating cancer.”
Dana-Farber, 379 F. Supp. 3d at 76. The Japanese application could not claim cancer treatment methods
as the district court described because a method of treating human bodies is not patentable as an
industrially inapplicable invention. Patent Act, 1959 (Act. No. 121/ art. 29 Japan); Examination
Guidelines for Patent and Utility Model in Japan, Pt. III, Ch. 1., 3101,
https://www.jpo.go.jp/e/system/laws/rule/guideline/patent/tukujitu_kijun/
72. Dana-Farber, 379 F. Supp. 3d at 76.
73. Dana-Farber, 379 F. Supp. 3d at 77.
74. Id.
75. Dana-Farber, 964 F.3d at 1373.
76. Dana-Farber, 379 F. Supp. 3d at 77.
77. Id. at 78.
78. See id. at 102.
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PD-L1; (b) Dr. Wood’s discovery that PD-1/PD-L1 binding inhibits
the immune response; (c) Dr. Wood’s and Dr. Freeman’s discovery
that anti-PD-1 and anti-PD-L1 antibodies can block the PD-1/PD-L1
pathway’s inhibitory signal; and (d) Dr. Freeman’s experiments
confirming that PD-L1 is expressed in various. tumors.79
The Federal Circuit affirmed the decision finding joint
inventorship for the U.S. researchers.80 In denying Ono’s argument
that U.S. researchers’ contributions were too far removed from the
invention, the court emphasized that only a modicum of significance
is necessary for a contribution to qualify for joint inventorship: “There
is no ‘explicit lower limit on the quantum or quality of inventive
contribution required for a person to qualify as a joint inventor.’”81 The
court set forth three elements necessary to establish joint inventorship:
(1) contribution in some significant manner to the conception or
reduction to practice the invention; (2) that such contribution is not
insignificant in quality when the contribution is measured against the
full contribution; and (3) that such contribution more than merely
explains well-known concepts and/or the current state of the art to the
real inventors.82 Moreover, failure to participate in activities that led
to the conception of the invention does not necessarily forfeit
inventorship because joint inventors do not need to contribute to all
aspects of a conception.83 Speculative works, functions, and
unconfirmed results are sufficient for inventorship because the
conception is complete even without experimentation to confirm
whether the invention will work for its intended purpose.84
The Federal Circuit held that the novelty and nonobviousness of
the invention over a particular researcher’s contribution are irrelevant
to determine inventorship of the invention.85 It rejected Ono’s
argument that Dr. Wood’s and Dr. Freeman’s contributions were
insignificant because the Honjo patents were patentable over the 1999
provisional application, holding that “the novelty and nonobviousness
of the claimed inventions over the provisional application are not
probative of whether the collaborative research efforts of Drs. Honjo,
Freeman, and Wood led to the inventions claimed here or whether
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Dana-Farber, 964 F.3d at 1370.
Id. at 1367.
Id. at 1371 (quoting Eli Lilly & Co. v. Aradigm Corp., 376 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
Id. at 1371.
Id.
Id. at 1372.
Id.
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each researcher’s contributions were significant to their conception.”86
The Federal Circuit further refused to adopt a rigid rule to
categorically exclude works in the state of art. Instead, it held that
works made public before the date of conception may qualify as a
significant contribution unless they were simple explanations of the
state of art.87 When inventors worked together to create a collaborative
enterprise, each inventor who disclosed ideas less than the total
invention to others should qualify as a coinventor.88
Ono’s attempt to overturn the district court decision failed again
when the U.S. Supreme Court rejected its request to examine the
Federal Circuit’s inventorship jurisprudence.89 As a result, under the
post-Dana-Farber inventorship standard, anyone who shared ideas
and information of their research with another can qualify as a joint
inventor if the person who received their ideas and information
completes an invention, and the ideas and information given
contribute to the conception of the invention. Even one who made a
discovery of a law of nature or natural phenomenon may successfully
claim to be a joint inventor without contributing to applying the
discovery and converting it into an invention. Although the court
focused more on collaboration than significance of contribution, the
period of collaboration was stretched to include Dr. Freeman’s
discovery of a ligand—even though the ligand was discovered prior to
his collaboration with other researchers—because Dr. Wood found the
ligand bound with PD-1 after the collaboration. Moreover, the court
failed to clarify the time at which the significance of the contribution
should be examined. Assessing the significance at the time of
contribution, instead of at conception, which would lead to a confusion
that post-contribution disclosures may risk entitlement of joint
inventorship. Such a confusion would discourage early disclosure of
discoveries of laws of nature which are the “building blocks of human
ingenuity.”90
II.

Pre-AIA Patent Act: First-To-Invent

The joint inventorship standard under the current case law is
overinclusive. This standard includes both inventors who contributed
86. Id.
87. Dana-Farber, 964 F.3d at 1372.
88. Id.
89. Ono Pharm. Co. v. Dana-Farber Cancer Inst., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 2691 (Mem.) (2021).
90. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 85 (2012); Alice Corp. Pty.
Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
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to the conception of an original invention and those who contributed
to the conception of improvements of the original invention—even if
these inventions are separately claimed and independently patented.
The standard also includes those who made related discoveries of a
law of nature or natural phenomenon. This overinclusive inventorship
standard resulted from courts’ efforts to modernize the U.S. patent
system in response to several revisions of the patent laws by Congress.
These revisions were intended to address the needs of industries in
new technology fields and correct the misassumption of stand-alone
innovation by a single inventor. The joint inventorship standard was
limited to include only inventors that contributed all claimed subject
matter and satisfied a heightened collaboration requirement before the
1984 Patent Law Amendments.91 The 1984 amendments expanded
that limited inventorship standard to include all inventors who
contributed to serial related inventions, overcoming a disadvantage
unique to the first-to-invent system that had previously prevented joint
inventors from effectively patenting the inventions resulting from the
cumulative innovation and collaboration.
For example, a contribution by Dr. Wood and Dr. Freeman, i.e.,
the inventions claimed in their 1999 provisional application, was prior
art as a prior invention and a derived invention against the inventions
claimed by the Honjo Patents even if the contribution was kept secret
before the time that the inventions were made. Before the 1984
Amendments, had the inventions claimed in the Honjo Patents been
obvious over the contribution, Drs. Wood’s and Freeman’s
contribution should have prevented the Honjo patents from issuing
unless the named joint inventors were identical.92 Thus, omitting Dr.
Honjo and named inventors in the Honjo Patents as inventors on the
1999 provisional application should have jeopardized the Honjo
Patents if the inventions of the Honjo Patents been obvious over the
inventions of the provisional application. Because many inventions
resulting from collaboration in the same research project are closely
related and likely obvious in light of each other, contributions of joint
inventors’ own prior work were often cited to show obviousness and
therefore prevented related inventions from obtaining patents.
Because joint inventors’ own works were removed from the prior art
for obviousness only when all joint inventors were identical between
the works and the invention, the expansive inventorship standard
91. Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-622, 98 Stat. 3383 (1984).
92. For more discussion of this requirement, see infra notes 127–129 and accompanying text.
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including all inventors in the collaboration could protect the related
inventions from obviousness rejections. This common inventorship
exception was the only protection for inventions from collaboration
until Congress introduced another exception.
A. Pre-1984 Inventorship
1.Originality Requirement: Derivation
Determination of the true inventor (or coinventors) is essential
to the constitutional goal of the U.S. Patent System, which is to give
the inventor an exclusive right to the claimed invention.93 The U.S.
courts developed the jurisprudence as to the determination of a true
and first inventor under the first-to-invent system until the firstinventor-to-file provision of AIA was enacted in 2013.94 The pre-AIA
requirement of granting a patent only to a true and original inventors
was called “originality.”95 The pre-AIA Patent Act, § 102(f), provided
lack of originality as a ground of rejection or invalidity by preventing
the patenting of an invention if the invention was derived from any
other source than the inventor named in the application or patent.96 To
ensure the originality of invention, the inventor had to file a patent
application with an oath stating that he was the original and first
inventor.97 For joint inventions, all joint inventors had to file a patent
jointly with an oath stating that the joint inventors met the originality
and first-to-invent requirements with respect to the claimed
invention.98 This procedural aspect of the originality requirement
stemmed from the inventor-centric policy of U.S. patent system and
was in stark contrast to the patent systems of first-to-file countries
which focus on ownership and allow assignees, especially employers
of inventors, to file patent applications.99
The substantive aspect of the originality requirement prevented
non-true inventors from obtaining a patent and allowed the
invalidation of a patent if a patent issued to a non-inventor who
93. U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
94. AIA was enacted in law on September 16, 2011. Most provisions became effect on September
16, 2012 but the first-to-file provision became effective on March 16, 2013. Leahy-Smith America
Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
95. 2 CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 2, at § 2.01.
96. Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(f), OddzOn Products Inc. v. Just Toys Inc., 122 F.3d 1396, 1401 (Fed.
Cir. 1997).
97. Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. §§ 111, 115.
98. Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 116.
99. Fasse, Muddy Metaphysics, supra note 2, at 159.
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derived the invention from another inventor. This substantive
requirement was intertwined with first-to-invent priority as the
examination of the originality requirement focused on inventorship.
The inquiry aimed to determine whether the named inventor was the
first and true inventor by confirming that the invention under
examination was not derived from another person.100 In addition to
providing that a derived invention as prior art, pre-AIA § 102 also
provided for a variety of prior art categories that were applied to
determine the novelty and priority of an invention under
examination.101 One of the prior art categories was a prior invention
under § 102(g). 102 Courts interpreted § 102(g) and developed a priority
rule.103 As an inventor who derived the invention from another
inventor may not be a true inventor even if that inventor established
the priority of the invention date under the priority rule, derivation was
frequently claimed in priority disputes at the USPTO and in courts.104
The principal rule awarded priority to the inventor who was the first
to reduce the invention to practice.105 Reduction to practice occurs
either by (1) constructing a product or performing a process that is
within the scope of the invention as defined by the claims and testing
the product or process to demonstrate that the invention works as
intended (actual reduction to practice);106 or (2) filing a patent
application with a patent office meeting the disclosure requirements
under the U.S. Patent Act (constructive reduction to practice).107
An exception to this principal rule was an early conception.108
Early conception allowed an inventor to establish priority over the first
inventor to reduce the invention to practice by showing an earlier date
of conception and continuous and reasonable diligence toward
100. Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Applegate v. Scherer, 332 F.2d 571, 573
(C.C.P.A. 1964).
101. Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102. For more discussion, see Part II, A. 3, infra.
102. Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(g).
103. 3A DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS, § 10.03 (2022).
104. Anthony A. Hartmann, Derivation and the PTAB, FINNEGAN, (Jan.-Feb. 2015),
https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/articles/derivation-and-the-ptab.html
[https://perma.cc/ZB9UJJ6E].
105. Price, 988 F.2d at 1190 (“Priority goes to the first party to reduce an invention to practice unless
the other party can show that it was the first to conceive the invention and that it exercised reasonable
diligence in later reducing that invention to practice.”).
106. Scott v. Finney, 34 F.3d 1058, 1061 (Fed. Cir. 1994); 3A CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 103,
at § 10.06.
107. Hyatt v. Boone, 146 F.3d 1348, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1998); 3A CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note
103, at § 10.05.
108. Griffin v. Bertina, 285 F.3d 1029, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Toshiko Takenaka, Rethinking the
United States First-to-Invent Principle from a Comparative Law Perspective: A Proposal to Restructure
§ 102 Novelty and Priority Provisions, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 621, 652 (2002), available at
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/faculty-articles/349 [hereinafter Takenaka, Rethinking].
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reduction to practice.109 Both the first-to-reduce inventor and the early
conception inventor lost their first-to-invent priority under the
principal rule if they unreasonably delayed making the invention
available to the public, which included abandoning, suppressing or
concealing the invention (“abandonment”).110
Alternatively, an inventor could defeat a competing inventor
without showing reasonable diligence by establishing that the
invention was derived from her.111 Courts acknowledged that
derivation and priority were akin to focusing on inventorship.
However, the courts emphasized that these concepts were also distinct
and separate from each other because an originality inquiry in a
derivation involved a determination of the origin of only one invention
while a priority inquiry involved a determination of the first-to-invent
between the inventors of two independent inventions.112 To show
derivation, an inventor had to show (1) a conception of the invention
prior to the competing inventor’s conception and (2) communication
of the conception to the competing inventor.113 The communication
had to be sufficient to enable one skilled in the art to make the patented
invention.114 If there was evidence of prior conception without
communication, the inventions were made independently and
separately and thus courts should decide the first-to-invent under the
priority rule and grant a patent to one of the inventors based on the
outcome of that proceeding.115
The case law has been unclear on whether the communication of
less than the conception gives rise to joint inventorship.116 In DanaFarber, the Federal Circuit found communication of partial
110

Pointer v. Six Wheel Corp., 177 F.2d 153, 157 (9th Cir. 1949). To defeat a patent issued, suggestions
from another must include the plan of improvement and must have provide such information sufficient
to enable the person to whom the communication enabled an ordinary mechanic to construct the
improvement. For a general discussion of derivation, see 3A CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 103, at §
10:07.
110. 3A CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 103, at § 10:08. Courts typically found an abandonment
when the first-to-reduce inventor was spurred into activity. E.g., Woofter v. Carlson, 367 F.2d 436
(C.C.P.A. 1966).
111. Howard v. Jenkins, 202 U.S.P.Q. 774, 781 (B.P.A.I. 1977).
112. Applegate, 332 F.2d at 571; Price, 988 F.2d at 1187.
113. Creative Compounds, LLC v. Starmark Labs., 651 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
114. Gambro Lundia AB v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 110 F.3d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Eaton
Corp. v. Rockwell Int’l. Corp., 323 F.3d 1332, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
115. Even for priority, conception had to be communicated or disclosed in some form because
inventors’ own oral testimony needed to be supported by written documents or testimony of non-inventor.
E.g, Schumierer v. Newton, 397 F.2d 1010, 1368 (C.C.P.A. 1968).
116. 3A CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 103, at § 10:10[4][d][ii][A] (“It is particularly opaque on
a critical point on the relationship between joint inventorship and derivation: can there be joint
inventorship when two person mingle ideas in a single communication but do not otherwise collaborate
or agree to coordinate work? Can two persons be unwilling joint inventors?”).
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conception was sufficient for joint inventorship where the inventors
exchanged ideas multiple times and thus created a collaborative
enterprise.117 As in Dana-Farber, courts and parties frequently mix-up
arguments of priority and derivation because the concepts of priority
and derivation are so intertwined. Here, Dana-Farber and Ono
disputed who was the first to have the complete conception, i.e., the
connection of blocking the pathway and cancer treatment.118 This
argument was proper for priority if Dana-Farber was claiming priority
of separate and independent inventions by Drs. Wood and Freeman
over the inventions of the Honjo Patents. However, for joint
inventorship, it does not matter who is the first to reach the conception
of the invention. The U.S. and Japanese researchers should be found
joint inventors only if they jointly and collectively contributed to the
development of the claimed invention.
2.Restrictive Inventorship Standard
The inventorship standard that courts applied prior to the 1984
Patent Amendments was more restrictive than the current standard
applied by the Federal Circuit in Dana-Farber. That narrow standard
was highlighted by a comment by Justice Story on a jury verdict for
joint inventorship by both the plaintiff and defendant:
If the plaintiff and defendant separately and
independently invented several parts of the machine,
capable of a distinct use, then those parts might be
considered as separate inventions, for which each
inventor might, perhaps, be entitled to a separate patent.
But the present patent claims the invention, as a whole;
and the jury find, that in this invention they were both
concerned; which I cannot understand in any other sense,
than as verifying the invention to be a joint, simultaneous
production of the genius and labor of both parties.119
Unlike Dana-Farber, the joint inventorship standard under the
early case law depended on the patentability of the invention over a
particular contribution, i.e., a prior work of a joint inventor. If an
invention for one component and an invention for another component
were separately patentable, they were considered two unique
117. Dana-Farber Cancer Inst., Inc. v. Ono Pharm. Co., 964 F.3d 1365, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
118. Dana-Farber Cancer Inst., Inc. v. Ono Pharm. Co., 379 F. Supp. 3d 53, 94 (D. Mass. 2019),
aff’d, 964 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
119. Stearns v. Barrett, 22 F. Cas. 1175, 1181 (No. 13,337) (C.C.D. Mass. 1816).
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inventions by two sole inventors instead of one invention by joint
inventors. This was true even if the inventors sought to patent an entire
machine which was the joint invention of both inventors. This same
logic supported Ono’s argument in Dana-Farber that inventors of a
prior invention are not joint inventors of an improvement on the prior
invention if the improvement was patentable over the prior invention.
Moreover, the collaboration requirement adopted by Justice
Story was more difficult to meet than the requirement under the
current case law. Justice Story’s standard first required courts to
dissect a machine into its respective elements, and then required that
all inventors collaborate not only the entire machine, but also on all
elements of the machine. Under this restrictive inventorship standard,
inventors should obtain a separate patent for any distinctive element
to which the other inventors failed to contribute. A feature was found
to be distinct when that feature was included in a separate claim, unless
the feature contributed to the operation of the machine.120 Thus, joint
inventors could not file for a patent of joint invention unless they each
contributed to the subject matter covered by all of the claims (“all
claims” rule.)121 Pre-1984 Amendment case law applied this all-claims
rule in examining the inventorship of mechanical inventions.122 A
patent covering a machine was invalid when issued if any of the
machine elements resulted from independent contribution by
respective joint inventors of the entire machine—those elements were
considered sole inventions by the respective joint inventors and
distinct from the entire machine.123
Moreover, courts historically found joint inventorship only when
inventors had worked toward a common end to which they had agreed.
For example, in Pointer v. Six Wheel, the Ninth Circuit cited the
definition of joint inventorship given by Prof. Robinson’s patent law
treatise, holding:

120. De Laski & Thropp Circular Woven Tire Co. v. William R. Thropp & Sons Co., 218 F. 458,
464 (D.N.J. 1914), aff’d 226 F. 941 (3d Cir. 1915).
121. In re Sarett, 327 F.2d 1005, 1010 (C.C.P.A. 1964); In re Hamilton, 37 F.2d 758, 759 (C.C.P.A.
1930).
122. Worden v. Fisher, 11 F. 505 (1882); Butler v. Bainbridge, 29 F. 142 (1886); Consolidated
Bunging Apparatus Co. v. Woerle, 29 F. 449 (1887); Belle Patent Button Fastener Co. v. Lucas, 28 F.
371 (1886); Schlicht &F. Co. v. Chicago Sewing Machine Co., 36 F. 585 (1888); Priestley v. Montague,
47 F. 650 (1888); Page Woven Wire Fence Co. v. Land, 49 F. 936 (1891); De Laval Separator Co. v.
Vermont Farm Mach. Co., 135 F. 772 (2d Cir. 1904); Quincey Mining Co. v. Krause, 151 F. 1012 (6th
Cir. 1907); Sieber & Trussell Mfg. Co. v. Chicago Binder & File Co., (C.C.) 177 F. 437 (N.D. Ill. 1910).
123. Rival Mfg. Co. v. Dazey Prods. Co., 358 F. Supp. 91, 101 (W.D. Mo. 1973); Stewart v. Tenk,
32 Fed. 665 (S.D. Ill. 1887).
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[J]oint invention implies, as Robinson says, that two or
more inventors agree “that a result, if it could be
achieved, would be desirable, neither as yet having
attempted to provide a means, and from this point go
forward by mutual consultations and suggestions.”
[T]he product of the joint endeavor is a joint invention
when . . . “before the entire conception of the invention
by one inventor, another meets him and by his consent
unites with him in exercising inventive skill upon the
development and perfecting of the conception.”124
To meet this heightened collaboration requirement,
“simultaneous conception and shared contribution” by all named
inventors was necessary.125 Under the pre-1984 case law, inventors
had to work together—at least for the crucial time—towards a
common end that resulted from “the contributions and united efforts”
of all inventors.126 Joint inventorship was denied when inventors did
not agree to a common end such as when the alleged joint inventor
rejected the named inventor’s suggestion, resulting in a separately
patentable improvement of the original structure that the alleged
inventor was working on. Courts also focused on a common end and
result, which named and alleged inventors agreed on and jointly
accomplished, when determining joint inventorship.127
In short, many of those who qualify as joint inventors under the
current case law would have been considered sole inventors under the
pre-1984 case law. The requirement of the pre-1984 case law of a
common end worked well with respect to inventions in the mechanical
art, as the end and result of inventions in the mechanical arts are
predictable to one skilled in the art of invention and the inventive
process usually begins with the identification of the technical problem
which the inventors are seeking to solve. However, that approach does
not work as well with inventions in the unpredictable arts, such as

124. Pointer, 177 F.2d at 158. Courts frequently cited Robinson’s treatise to support their joint
inventorship determination.
125. Ethicon, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Newman
dissenting).
126. McKinnon Chain Co. v. American Chain Co., 268 F. 353, 360 (3d Cir. 1920); Gorge v. Perkins,
1 F.2d 978, 979 (8th Cir. 1924).
127. McKinnon Chain Co., 268 F. at 360 (Finding joint inventorship for inventors who worked at the
crucial time worked together for a common end that the inventors accomplished by their contributions
and united efforts of both).
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chemistry and biotechnology, in which an end result becomes clear
only after a sample embodying the invention is constructed and tested.
In Dana-Farber, for example, it was unclear when Drs. Wood,
Freeman and Honjo agreed and joined their efforts to the useful end of
providing cancer treatments by controlling the immune response
inhibitive function of the PD-1/PD-L1 pathway. While the U.S. and
Japanese researchers were keenly aware of possible drug
development, they did not come up with the end result concretely
before Dr. Freeman’s experiments to express PD-L1 on tumor cells or
Dr. Iwai’s experiment to confirm the inhibitive function of the
pathway.128 In particular, it is unlikely that Drs. Wood and Freeman
would have qualified for joint inventorship under the pre-1984
collaboration requirement as they failed to participate in Dr. Iwai’s
experiment. Therefore, they failed to collaborate at the crucial time
and the invention did not result from united efforts of U.S. and
Japanese researchers.129 Because the inventions of the Honjo Patents
were separately patentable, Drs. Wood and Freeman were joint
inventors of the Honjo patents only if they can meet the heightened
collaboration requirement.
The restrictive standard of the pre-1984 collaboration
requirement introduced uncertainty in patent validity for joint
inventorship because patent owners had no procedure to correct
inventorship once an error was found.130 Although the enactment of
1952 Patent Act introduced inventorship correction procedures and
made procedures for preventing patent invalidity available to patent
owners,131 the restrictive inventorship standard with a heightened
collaboration requirement survived the 1952 overhaul of the patent
system and continued to control inventorship disputes until the 1984
Amendments adopted the current inclusive inventorship standard in §
116.132

128. Dana-Farber Cancer Inst., Inc. v. Ono Pharm. Co., 379 F. Supp. 3d 53, 88 (D. Mass. 2019),
aff’d, 964 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
129. Id. at 89.
130. MCV, Inc. v. King-Seeley Thermos Co., 870 F.2d 1568, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“Before the
enactment of section 256, patentees and their assignees committed inventorship errors at their peril;
misjoinder or nonjoinder of an inventor rendered the patent invalid.”). In addition, there was no procedure
to correct inventorship during the prosecution. Morris Relson, Misjoinder of Inventors in Patent
Applications, 27 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 546 (1945). See generally 2 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON
PATENTS, § 2.04[1] (2021).
131. Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593. 66 Stat. 792, §§ 116, 256 (1952).
132. E.g., S. W. Farber, Inc. v. Tex. Instruments, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 686, 690 (D. Del. 1962).

96

CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP.

3.First-To-Invent
Novelty:
Inventorship Exception

VOL 21:2

Common

The AIA revised the definition of the prior art and replaced the
first-to-invent system with the first-inventor-to-file (FITF) system
which is a hybrid of the first-to-invent and first-to-file systems.133 The
prior art definition under the FITF system applies to applications filed
on and after March 16, 2013 (AIA FITF date).134 Thus, the validity of
patents resulting from applications filed before AIA FITF date, such
as the Honjo patents, is still examined under the first-to-invent
system.135 Pre-AIA case law also applies when determining the
inventorship of such patents.
The first-to-invent subsections concerning novelty which
provide prior inventions were also intertwined with and closely related
to inventorship. Under pre-AIA law, the first-to-invent was
determined by whether the invention under examination was made by
others than the named inventor prior to the date that the invention
under examination was made. Therefore, the § 102 novelty
subsections provided three types of prior inventions made by others to
exclude inventors’ own prior inventions (“common inventorship
exception”) as prior art in addition to a derived invention.136 Among
the three types of prior inventions, only the first type required public
availability of the invention prior to the invention date. This
requirement was based on the rationale that the named inventor was
not the first-to-invent if the invention was known or used publicly or
patented or described in a printed publication by others prior to the
invention.137 The remaining types of prior inventions were available
as prior art with the common inventorship exception even if they were

133. For a comparison of the first-inventor-to-file system with the first-to-invent system and the firstto-file system, see Toshiko Takenaka, Has the United States Adopted a First-to-File System Through
America Invents Act?: A Comparative Law Analysis of Patent Priority Under First-Inventor-to-File,
GERMAN ASS’N. FOR PROT. OF INTELL. PROP. INT’L. 304 (Jan. 2012), available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1986987 [https://perma.cc/NR4Q-TAQK] [hereinafter, Takenaka, First-toFile].
134. USPTO, Manual of Patent Examining Procedure, § 2015 (9th ed, 2019, last rev. June 2020)
[hereinafter MPEP].
135. The AIA defines the filing date as the effective filing date. The effective filing date is either (1)
the actual filing date with U.S.PTO, or (2) the filing date of the earliest application for which the patent
or application is entitled to a right of priority or the benefit of an earlier filing date under international
agreements or the U.S. Patent Act. For example, the international patent application for the Honjo patents
claimed priority from the Japanese application dating July 3, 2002, which is therefore the effective filing
date of the Honjo patents.
136. Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), (e), (f)–(g).
137. Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(a).
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not publicly available on the invention date (secret prior art).138 They
included (1) a prior invention under § 102(e) which was disclosed in
a patent application pending at the USPTO 139 and (2) a prior invention
under § 102(g) where the first-to-invent inventor did not have any
communication with the second-to-invent inventor of the invention
under examination and did not abandon the invention.140
The first type of secret prior art originated from the 1926
Supreme Court Milburn decision allowing inventors to rely on their
pending applications to establish the date of invention.141 The Milburn
doctrine was later codified to define the content of the patent
application as prior art because an invention disclosed in a pending
application showed that the invention was made on the filing date of
the pending application and the named inventor was not the first-toinvent if the filing date was prior to the invention.142 In Hazeltine
Research, Inc. v. Brenner, the Supreme Court made clear that the first
type secret prior art was available for not only lack of novelty but also
obviousness.143 In In re Bass, the Court of Patent Customs and Patent
Appeals (CCPA) confirmed that a prior invention by others was prior
art for both novelty and nonobviousness regardless of public access.144
Accordingly, when the first-to-invent inventor communicated her
invention to another inventor who made a related invention, the
communicated invention was also prior art against the related
invention as a derived invention even if the invention was kept secret
and the communication between the two inventors was confidential.145
In addition, § 102 provided that disclosures of the invention by
either the inventor or others were prior art under § 102(b) regardless
of whether those disclosures were made prior to the date that the
claimed invention was made, so long as they were patented or
described in a printed publication elsewhere or in public use or on sale
in the U.S. more than one year prior to the filing date.146 This type of
prior art was called a statutory bar. The first-to-invent requirement was
irrelevant to policy underlying this type of prior art because the goal
138. C. Douglass Thomas, Secret Prior Art—Get Your Priorities Straight!, 9 HARV. J. L. & TECH.
147 (1996) [hereinafter Thomas, Secret Prior Art].
139. Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. §.102(e).
140. Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(g).
141. Alexander Milburn Co. v. Davis-Bournonville Co., 270 U.S. 390, 399(1926).
142. Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(e).
143. Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Brenner, 382 U.S. 252, 255 (1965).
144. In re Bass, 474 F.2d 1276, 1286 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
145. OddzOn Products Inc. v. Just Toys Inc., 122 F.3d 1396, 1401 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
146. Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
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of the statutory bar was not to determine whether the inventor was the
first-to-invent, but to promote early patent applications once an
invention had become publicly available.147 Given this goal, any prior
disclosure of the invention was available as prior art against the current
claimed invention if it became publicly available at least one year prior
to the filing date of the claimed invention.148 The statutory bar prior art
included secret prior art by the inventor: using the invention
commercially or offering to sell the invention confidentially by the
inventor was prior art and prevented the inventor from obtaining a
patent, but such confidential use and sale did not prevent others from
obtaining a patent.149
The common inventorship exception—which excluded
inventors’ own prior invention from being considered as prior
inventions by others under 102(a), (e), and (g) with respect to novelty
and nonobviousness—resulted in the preferential treatment of
inventors seeking to patent their follow-on, obvious inventions after
filing an application for the original invention.150 Because their own
prior inventions were not prior art, inventions were not rejected or
invalidated for lack of novelty or nonobviousness over their own
work. However, inventors’ own works became available as statutory
bar prior art if the inventors did not file patent applications within one
year from public use, sale, patenting, or publication.151 Statutory bar
prior art under § 102(b) resulted in the disadvantageous treatment of
inventors seeking to improve the inventions of others. If the statutory
bar did not apply to inventors’ own prior works, only the double
patenting doctrine prevented inventors from obtaining more than one
patent on identical or obvious inventions.152 However, inventors were
able to patent obvious inventions if they filed a terminal disclaimer.153
For joint inventions, the theory of the inventive entity limited the
exclusion or inclusion of inventors’ own prior work from the novelty
147. Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 23–24 (1892). For the policy underlying the statutory bar prior
art, see Takenaka, Rethinking, supra note 108, at 630.
148. Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) reads: “the invention was patented or described in a printed
publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior
to the date of the application for patent in the United States.”
149. Metallizing Eng’g Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516, 518 (2d Cir. 1946).
150. See discussion supra note 136, Amy R. Motomura, Innovation and Own Prior Art, 72 HASTINGS
L. J. 565, 579 (2021) [hereinafter Motomura, Innovation].
151. Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
152. Two types of double patenting, statutory and obvious-type double patenting, prevent a patentee
from receiving two patents on identical or obvious inventions. In re Lonardo, 119 F.3d 960, 965 (Fed.
Cir. 1997). See also 3A CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 103, at Ch. 9.
153. 3A CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 103, at § 9.03.
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prior art and statutory prior art.154 The inventive entity theory
distinguished the sole inventorship of an individual inventor from joint
inventorship resulting from collaboration by an individual inventor
working with other individual inventors. Unless all individual
inventors are the same for a prior invention and the invention under
examination, the inventive entity is different and thus the common
inventorship exception does not apply to remove prior inventions from
the prior art.155 For example, if inventor A invented invention #1, filed
a patent application, and then jointly made invention #2 with another
individual inventor B, invention #1 would not be excluded from the
prior invention prior art because invention #1 was made by an
inventive entity (A) which was different from inventive entity of
invention #2 (A and B).156 Invention #2 would be rejected if it was
obvious over invention #1 because the first-to-invent priority should
be rewarded to the inventive entity of invention #1 (A) for not only
identical but also patentably indistinct obvious variations of the
invention. In contrast, both inventions would be patentable if joint
inventorship was construed more broadly to include individual
inventors A and B as joint inventors for both invention #1 and
invention #2 so that the common inventorship exception applies to
exclude invention #1 from prior art. As demonstrated by this example,
pre-1984 Patent Law Amendment case law’s restrictive inventorship
standard resulted in many different inventive entities, including only
the individual inventors who contributed to claimed subject matter.
These different inventive entities prevented inventors participating in
the same research project from taking advantage of the common
inventorship exception for excluding prior inventions. As a result, the
restrictive inventorship standard presented an obstacle to effectively
obtaining patents on inventions resulting from cumulative innovation
between multiple inventors because the inventions were closely
related and frequently obvious in light of each other.
Because inventors’ own work fell into prior inventions by others
unless the common inventorship exception applies under the inventive
entity theory, such works prevented them from obtaining patents on
154. 2 DONALD S. CHISUM, supra note 2, at § 2.03[1].
155. In re Land, 368 F.2d 866, 878 (C.C.P.A. 1966); Ex parte DesOrmeaux, 25 U.S.P.Q. 2d 2040,
2043 (B.P.A.I. 1992); MPEP, supra note 134, at § 2136.04.
156. 2 DONALD S. CHISUM, supra note 2, at § 2.03[1]. In practice, the USPTO and courts needed to
make the followings step for citing a reference: Identify portions of a prior art reference that they relied
on, evaluate the degree to which those portions were conceived by another, and decide whether that other
person’s contribution was significant. Duncan Parking Tech., Inc. v. IPS Grp., Inc., 914 F.3d 1347, 1358
(Fed. Cir. 2019).
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future related inventions. This prior art problem, caused by inventors’
own prior inventions, is known as “self-collision.”157 Self-collision
under the U.S. Patent Act was unique to the U.S. patent system
because the first-to-invent novelty requirement allowed the inclusion
of secret prior art in a novelty and nonobviousness analysis. Thus,
inventors could not prevent a self-collision because keeping their own
prior works secret did not prevent those inventions from falling into
the prior art. In contrast, under the European Patent Convention
(“EPC”), which is a model for most first-to-file patent systems, only
inventions and any subject matter made publicly available before the
filing date of the claimed invention under examination are considered
prior art.158 The only exception to that rule is the content of European
patent application which will be considered prior art even if it was not
published on or before the filing date. The content of such an
application is secret, as it is not publicly available on the filing date,
but is considered prior art as of the filing date once the application is
published.159 However, the content only supports the first-to-file
priority and thus is available only for examining novelty and is not
available for rejecting or invalidating based on the inventive step,
which is equivalent to obviousness under the U.S. Patent Act.160
Moreover, the double patenting doctrine of the first-to-file system
prevents only novelty type double patenting. Thus, inventors can
separately patent obvious inventions over their prior inventions
disclosed in a pending application as long as they file a patent
application on the obvious inventions before the eighteen-month
publication and the inventions are kept secret.161 The first-to-file
system effectively allows an 18-month extension of the patent term of
patents on prior inventions by allowing separate patents on obvious
inventions. As a result, self-collision problems in the first-to-file
157. Kate H. Murashige, The Hilmer Doctrine, Self Collision, Novelty and the Definition of Prior
Art, 26 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 549, 556 (1993).
158. European Patent Convention, art. 54(2), Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 255, 275-76 (Amended
Nov. 29, 2000) [hereinafter EPC].
159. EPC, art. 54(3).
160. EPC, art. 56. For the comparison of patentability between EPC and pre-AIA U.S. Patent Act,
see Toshiko Takenaka, The Best Patent Practice or Merely Compromise?: A Review of Current Draft
Patent Law Treaty and a Proposal for a First-to-Invent” Exception for Domestic Applicant, 11 TEX.
INTELL. PROP. L. J. 259 (2003).
161. EPO Case G 0004/19, Enl. Bd. App., ECLI:EP:BA:2021:G000419.20210622 at Paragraph 82
(Jun.
22,
2012),
available
at
https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-lawappeals/recent/g190004ex1.html [https://perma.cc/X4SF-3KF9] (“[T]he [double patenting] prohibition is
applicable for the same invention in respect of which there are several applications with the same date of
filing”). Under EPC, the invention disclosed in the pending application under EPC art. 54(3) is excluded
from the prior art for inventive step. Under EPC, the double patent doctrine applies to the same invention
applied by the same applicant. EPC, art. 56.
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system do not present serious challenges for effectively patenting
follow-up inventions resulting from the cumulative innovation.
In contrast, first-to-invent inventors could not prevent their prior
inventions from being considered as prior art references in novelty and
obviousness analyses by keeping them secret because their prior
inventions were considered available as secret prior art if the prior
inventions were made by different inventive entities.162 Any invention
later disclosed in a printed publication under § 102(a) or in a pending
application under § 102(e) could be backdated as a secret prior
invention under § 102(g). Therefore, any invention so disclosed
became prior art as of the invention date, which was prior to the
publication date or the filing date, once the invention date was
established.163 Unless the inventive entity was the same for the prior
invention and the invention under examination and the common
inventorship exception is applicable, the prior inventions could be
cited for obviousness if the prior inventions were disclosed in the
pending application with the earlier filing date164 or if the prior
inventions’ actual filing dates were prior to the invention’s actual
invention date.165 In other words, the scope of prior art changed
drastically depending on who were included in the inventive entities
as joint inventors.
Dana-Farber provides an instructive example of the potential
repercussions of this change of scope. There, inventors published the
discoveries concerning PD-L1 in a journal on October 2, 2000.166 The
discoveries disclosed in the journal were therefore available as prior
art as the invention described in a printed publication under § 102(a)
on the publication date.167 However, under the inventive entity theory,
the publication could be cited only if the inventive entities for the
disclosed discovery and the invention of the Honjo patents were
different.168 Likewise, the inventions disclosed in the provisional
application by the U.S. researchers became prior art under § 102(e) on
the filing date, November 10, 1999, once the application was replaced

162. Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(g).
163. In re Bass, 474 F.2d 1276, 1297 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
164. Id.
165. In re Land, 368 F.2d 866, 878 (C.C.P.A. 1966).
166. Dana-Farber Cancer Inst., Inc. v. Ono Pharm. Co., 964 F.3d 1365, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
167. Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(a).
168. 3A CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 103, at § 9.03, 2 DONALD S. CHISUM, supra note 103, at
§ 2.03[1], see also supra text accompanying notes 154-56.
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with the non-provisional application and subsequently published.169
The provisional application could be cited against the Honjo Patents
because Dr. Honjo was missing from the inventorship. Given these
different inventive entities, the date of availability as prior art of the
discoveries and inventions disclosed in the provisional application
could have been pushed back even further than the filing date to actual
invention dates in July 1998 through September 1999.170
In short, when different inventive entities were involved in
research projects, different types of prior art, each with different
timing to make inventors’ prior inventions available as prior art, put a
lot of pressure on those inventors’ employers to coordinate patent
prosecution in order to avoid obviousness rejections.171 If the
inventions of the Honjo Patents were obvious over the discoveries and
inventions disclosed in the journal and provisional application, no
patent could have issued on the pioneer cancer treatment. In contrast,
the Honjo Patents would be valid regardless of obviousness if the
earlier disclosed discoveries and inventions and the inventions of the
Honjo Patents were all made by the same inventive entities, including
all U.S. and Japanese researchers in the joint research project. Because
the date the invention was made under § 102(g) was uncertain but
determinable under the priority rule, effectively managing patent
prosecution on related inventions was a challenging task, which
ultimately led to extensive debates regarding removal of the secret
prior art.172
As highlighted in Dana-Farber, many inventors did not know
who qualified as joint inventors, and employers could not realistically
track all the activities of their employees and their research partners’
employees in order to decide the dates of the inventions resulting from
the joint research. Moreover, the availability of secret prior art would
incentivize research-intensive companies to move away from the U.S.,
since a prior invention under § 102(g) was available as prior art only
169. Dana-Farber Cancer Inst., Inc. v. Ono Pharm. Co., 379 F. Supp. 3d 53, 71 (D. Mass. 2019),
aff’d, 964 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2020). The invention described in a co-pending application became prior
art as of the effective filing date when the application was replaced with a corresponding international
application in August 2000 and published eighteen months from the November 1999 filing date. Pre-AIA
35 U.S.C. § 102(e).
170. Dana-Farber, 379 F. Supp. 3d at 66–69. Although discoveries are not inventions, they should
become prior art when they were actually discovered under Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(g).
171. Bermard E. Franz, Prosecution Problems with a Plurality of Inventions From a Single Project,
51 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 559 (1969).
172. In re Bass, 474 F.2d 1276, 1297 (C.C.P.A. 1973); Harris A. Pitlick, A Proposed Compromise to
the “Prior Art” Controversy Surrounding In Re Hellsund and In Re Bass, 56 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 699,
710 (1974) [hereinafter Pitlick, Proposed Compromise].
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if the invention was made in the U.S.173 Even worse, inventors no
longer had a resort if their inventions were rejected for obviousness
once the USPTO overturned its practice to allow applicants to
overcome an obviousness rejection with a terminal disclaimer.174 As a
result, employers who were the common assignees of applications
covering inventions which were obvious in light of each other were
required to elect the first invention if they wanted to avoid expensive
and lengthy interference procedures.175 In short, pre-AIA first-toinvent laws presented serious obstacles to obtaining patents for
inventions resulting from cumulative innovation by limiting the
common inventorship exception to joint inventions made by the same
inventive entities.
Permitting secret prior art imposed the heavy administrative
burden on employers of keeping track of the order of priority among
the inventions claimed in all applications by different inventive
entities and informing the USPTO when related inventions were
rejected for obviousness.176 This burden could be enormous as
employers needed to file many applications by the different inventive
entities under the “all claims” rule.177 The best solution to avoid this
burden was to expand the inventorship standard to include all
individual inventors involved in a research project in the inventive
entity of the inventions.
B. 1984 Amendments to the U.S. Patent Laws
1. Statutory Inventorship Standard
In response to the industry outcry, Congress enacted the 1984
Patent Law Amendments which added a joint inventorship standard
for the first time.178 The 1984 Amendments aimed to introduce
flexibility into the patent application process for joint inventors which
reflected the realities of modern team research and encouraged
173. Pitlick, Proposed Compromise, supra note 172, at 709; Harold S. Mayer, Obvious Differences—
What Should the Points of Reference Be?, 55 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 516 (1973). The Patent Reform Act of
2007 expanded the geographical restriction on the prior invention prior art to include inventions made in
TRIPS member states. Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007)
(enacted).
174. Commissioner’s notice of January 9, 1967, at 834 O.G. 1615, reproduced in Bass, 474 F.2d at
1292.
175. This requirement was called the doctrine of election and discussed in In re Hession, 296 F.2d
930, 932 (C.C.P.A. 1960).
176. Pitlick, Proposed Compromise, supra note 172, at 710.
177. See In Re Sarett, In Re Hamilton, supra note 121 and accompanying text.
178. Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-622, 98 Stat. 3383 (1984).
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communication among joint inventors by removing the obstacles
created by allowing secret prior art.179 Congress viewed secret prior art
as disincentivizing research members from communicating and
sharing their works and intended to promote team research and thus
eliminated that disincentive through the inclusive inventive standard
and additional exception.180 The amended provision for joint
inventions includes negative guidance, denying the heightened
collaboration requirement implemented under the early case law,
stating:
(a) Joint Inventions.—
When an invention is made by two or more persons
jointly, they shall apply for patent jointly and each make
the required oath, except as otherwise provided in this
title. Inventors may apply for a patent jointly even
though (1) they did not physically work together or at the
same time, (2) each did not make the same type or
amount of contribution, or (3) each did not make a
contribution to the subject matter of every claim of the
patent.181
The legislative history of the 1984 Amendments supports the
proposition that Congress intended to clarify both the substantive
originality requirement, by giving guidance as to how to determine
joint inventors, and the procedural requirement, by clarifying
instances in which joint inventors can file a single application.182 The
definition of joint inventorship remains the same under current law
and is based on the inventorship guidance given by district courts in
Monsanto v. Kamp,183 and Industri A B v. Bendix Corp.184 In
Monsanto, in an effort to emphasize the flexibility of the inventorship
standard, Judge Holtzoff held:
179. 130 CONG. REC. 28,071 (Oct. 1, 1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5833–34. See also S.
REP. NO. 98-663, 2d Sess., at 7–9 (1984), available at https://ipmall.law.unh.edu/content/legislative-ipacts-lipa-history-archive-patents-0 [https://perma.cc/3KRM-ZA4V].
180. Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Distrib. Co., 973 F.2d 911, 917 (1992); Innovation
and Patent Law Reform: Hearings on H.R. 3285, H.R. 3286, and H.R. 3605 Before the Subcommittee on
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th
Cong. 2d Sess. 26–27, 61–62, 71–72 (1984) (statements of G. Mossinghoff and H. Manbeck, Jr.,).
181. Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-622, 98 Stat. 3384 (1984)[“1984 Patent
Law Amendment Act”].
182. 2 CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 2, at § 2.02; Section-by-Section Analysis of H.R. 6286,
Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, CONG. REC. 10527 (1984), reproduced in 9 CHISUM ON PATENTS,
App. 22.
183. Monsanto Co. v. Kamp, 269 F. Supp. 818 (D. D.C. 1967).
184. SAB Industri AB v. Bendix Corp., 199 U.S.P.Q. 95 (E.D. Va. 1978).
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A joint invention is the product of collaboration of the
inventive endeavors of two or more persons working
toward the same end and producing an invention by their
aggregate efforts. To constitute a joint invention, it is
necessary that each of the inventors work on the same
subject matter and make some contribution to the
inventive thought and to the final result. Each needs to
perform but a part of the task if an invention emerges
from all of the steps taken together. It is not necessary
that the entire inventive concept should occur to each of
the joint inventors, or that the two should physically
work on the project together. One may take a step at one
time, the other an approach at different times. One may
do more of the experimental work while the other makes
suggestions from time to time. The fact that each of the
inventors plays a different role and that the contribution
of one may not be as great as that of another, does not
detract from the fact that the invention is joint, if each
makes some original contribution, though partial, to the
final solution of the problem.185
The current § 116 definition adopted three key aspects of
negative guidance. The first two aspects of negative guidance, (1)
physical collaboration and (2) degree of contributions, were adopted
from Monsanto. However, the statute did not adopt the requirement of
two or more persons working toward the same end and on the same
subject matter.186 While Judge Holtzoff required each joint inventor to
contribute to the inventive thought, and thus touched upon the required
quality of contribution, the updated statute did not include any
guidance on quality. As a result, the § 116 joint inventorship definition
has been interpreted to give no explicit lower limit on the quantum or
quality of contribution in order to be qualified for joint inventorship.187
The third and last aspect of negative guidance provided by the
amendment, expressly rejecting the “all claims” rule, is based on SAB
Industri AB. There, Judge Bryan rejected the defendants’ argument
that “the joint inventors must have combined their efforts as to each
claim in the patent.”188 This last aspect of guidance does not relate to
185. Monsanto, 269 F. Supp. at 824.
186. 35 U.S.C. § 116 (2018), see supra note 183 and accompanying text.
187. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Aradigm Corp., 376 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Fina Oil & Chem. Co.
v. Ewen, 123 F.3d 1466, 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
188. SAB Industri AB, 199 U.S.P.Q. at 104.
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the joint inventorship standard itself, but simply clarifies that inventors
who contributed to any claim can file a single patent application.189
The third aspect of guidance has no effect on the requirement of
contribution to the conception of subject matter for joint inventorship.
It simply allows inventors to file a single patent application unless the
subject matter expressed in one claim and subject matter expressed in
other claims are directed to two independent and distinct inventions
and thus only one of the inventions must be elected for further
prosecution.190
2.Expansion of Prior Art Exception
The 1984 Patent Law Amendments Act introduced another prior
art exception based on the common ownership which extensively
overlaps with the common inventorship exception.191 The common
ownership exception addressed the secret prior art problem
highlighted in Bass; it removed § 102(g) prior inventions from the
obviousness prior art if the prior invention and the invention claimed
in the application or patent were owned by the same person or subject
to an assignment obligation to the same person on the date that the
invention was made.192 In Bass, Judge Rich excluded § 102(f) derived
prior inventions from the prior art in all obviousness inquiries.193
Despite the broad exclusion in Bass, the common ownership exception
under the 1984 Amendments explicitly removed derived inventions
from prior art considerations for obviousness where the subject matter
is commonly owned.194
Even if the newly introduced exception protected commonly
owned inventions from an obviousness rejection over secret prior
inventions and/or derived inventions, the double-patenting doctrine
provides that inventors should not seek to separately patent obvious
189. Prof. Chisum commented that the guidance is simply a rejection of the “all claims” rule instead
of the definition of joint inventor. 2 CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 2, at § 2.02[2][a].
190. 35 U.S.C. § 121 (2018).
191. Pre-AIA 35 USC, §103(c)(1).
192. See Motomura, Innovation, supra note 150, at 583-84; Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984 §
103, 98 Stat. at 3384 (“Section 103 of title 35, United States Code is amended by adding . . . . Subject
matter developed by another person, which qualifies as prior art only under subsection (f) or (g) of section
102 of this title, shall not preclude patentability under this section where the subject matter and the
claimed invention were, at the time the invention was made, owned by the same person or subject to an
obligation of assignment to the same person.”).
193. In re Bass, 474 F.2d 1276, 1290 (C.C.P.A. 1973). Judge Rich had the view that § 102(c)
abandonment, (d) first foreign patenting, and (f) derivation were not prior art and have no relation to
obviousness.
194. S. REP. NO. 98-663, 2d Sess. at 7 (1984). Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(c). It is likely that Congress
was aware of the possibility that derived inventions are viewed as prior art.
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inventions to extend the term of the earliest issued patent.195 Congress
expected the USPTO to issue a double patenting rejection if the
invention under examination was obvious in light of an invention
claimed in an earlier patent owned by a common assignee. The
USPTO would then allow the common assignee to overcome the
rejection by agreeing to disclaim the term of the later patent so that
both patents expire at the same time.196 In response to this
Congressional expectation, the USPTO revived the common
ownership terminal disclaimer practice, allowing applicants to
overcome double patent rejections for obvious inventions.197
Although the 1984 Patent Law Amendments did not eliminate
prior inventions described in a co-pending patent application under §
102(e) from the prior art, the subsequent 1999 amendment further
revised the obviousness provision and eliminated these prior
inventions as prior art for obviousness under the common ownership
exception.198 Even still, neither 1984 nor 1999 Amendments protected
inventions resulting from open innovation where inventors were
subjected to assignment obligations to different employers, as
represented by the facts in Dana-Farber. Contrary to Judge Rich’s
view in Bass, the Federal Circuit confirmed that a derived invention
can be prior art for obviousness in OddzOn.199 The industry viewed the
decision as giving a serious disincentive to communication among
inventors employed by different employers and providing a serious
threat to public-private collaboration.200
In response to that critique, Congress enacted the Cooperative
Research and Technology Enhancement (CREATE) Act which
expanded the scope of secret prior art exceptions to works resulting
from collaboration under joint research agreements.201 In order to
qualify for the exception, the invention must meet three requirements:
(1) the invention was made by or on behalf of parties of a joint research
195. 3A CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 103, at § 9.01, Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. v.
Breckenridge Pharmaceutical Inc., 909 F.3d 1355, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
196. S. REP. NO. 98-663, at 8. Congress’ intent to reinstitute the double patenting practice is discussed
in In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 895 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
197. In re Longi, 759 F.2d at 895; USPTO, Initial Guidelines as to Implementation of Patent Law
Amendment, reprinted in 29 BNA’s PAT. T.M. & COPY. J. 214 (Dec. 20, 1984).
198. 35 U.S.C. § 103(c) amended by American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106113, § 4807(a), 113 Stat. 1501A-552,1501A-591 (1999). See also Motomura, Innovation, supra note
150, at 586.
199. OddzOn Products Inc. v. Just Toys Inc., 122 F.3d 1396, 1401 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
200. H.R. REP. No. 108-425, at 5 (2004). Motomura, Innovation, supra note 150, at 586–87.
201. Cooperative Research and Technology Enhancement (CREATE) Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108453, 118 Stat. 3596 (2004). A terminal disclaimer requirement applies to obvious-type patents resulting
from the joint research agreement exception.
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agreement that was in effect on or before the invention date; (2) the
invention was covered by the scope of the agreement; and (3) the
application claiming the invention disclosed the names of the
parties.202 In addition, the agreement must be “a written contract, grant,
or cooperative agreement entered into by two or more persons or
entities for the performance of experimental, developmental, or
research work in the field of the claimed invention.”203
In short, the CREATE amendment finally provided a solution
for inventions resulting from the open innovation of the key
stakeholders in the biopharmaceutical industry, such as collaborations
by U.S. and Japanese inventors in Dana-Farber. However, this
amendment did not remove all challenges associated with inventions
that are the product of open innovation. For example, requiring a
written contract before an invention may present a challenge because
academic researchers frequently begin their collaboration and
information exchange informally. Additionally, it is difficult to predict
future inventions and the scope of research project at the early stage
of drug and therapy development. If a formal agreement was not
available, the flexible and inclusive inventorship standard sometimes
came in to rescue inventions by excluding inventors’ own prior
inventions from the prior art for obviousness.
3.Inclusive Inventorship Standard
a. Relaxed Collaboration Requirement
In 1982, two years prior to the 1984 Patent Law Amendments,
the Federal Circuit was created.204 In response to the industry need to
remove the obstacles for collaboration, the court began to develop the
current overinclusive inventorship standard by taking over CCPA’s
case law and exercising exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from
district courts on inventorship disputes.205 In Kimberly-Clark v.
Procter Gamble, the Federal Circuit gave its first interpretation of the
202. Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(c)(2) (2010).
203. Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(c)(3) (2010).
204. Federal Courts Improvements Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982).
205. The Federal Circuit was created from the merger of CCPA and the appellate division of the
Court of Claims. It adopted the case law of CCPA as controlling precedents. CCPA had exclusive
jurisdiction over appeals from interferences at USPTO but did not have jurisdiction over appeals from
district court. Congress gave the exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from district courts when the Federal
Circuit was created. Federal Court Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982). For more
discussion, see Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Constitution of Patent Law The Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals and the Shape of the Federal Circuit’s Jurisprudence, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 843 (2010).
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§ 116 joint invention provision.206 The court rejected the argument that
the new standard completely eliminated the collaboration requirement
on basis of the legislative history. The decision cited the principles of
joint inventorship in Monsanto to find that “[a] joint invention is the
product of collaboration of the inventive endeavors of two or more
persons working toward the same end and producing an invention by
their aggregate efforts.”207 The court further explained that the
requirement was not met if a person did not understand the invention
but simply followed an instruction of the named inventor.208 While
preserving the collaboration requirement, the Federal Circuit relaxed
the requirement for finding joint inventorship if courts find “some of
elements of joint behavior, such as collaboration or working under
common direction, one inventor seeing a relevant report and building
upon it or hearing another’s suggestion at a meeting.”209 Under this
relaxed collaboration requirement, inventors no longer need to work
toward the common end that they agreed upon and joined their efforts
to achieve, as required by the pre-1984 case law.210
The Federal Circuit continued to develop the relaxed
collaboration requirement through the influence of the broad joint
inventorship interpretation in General Motors v. Toyota.211 In General
Motors, a few years prior to the 1984 Amendments, the Sixth Circuit
upheld the district court decision finding joint inventorship for all
inventors who worked in different groups to engage in serial, in-house
concerted projects, despite the fact that each group did not work
together at the same time. The district court distinguished
collaborations within a large business entity from other types of
collaborations, holding that “where numerous ‘inventors’ all worked
under the aegis of one employer toward a common goal, it is
appropriate to define the concept of joint invention broadly.”212 The
court rationalized its broad interpretation because “it is not realistic to
require in such circumstances that joint inventors work side-by-side,
and that each step in the inventive process be taken by all the firm’s
206. Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Distrib. Co., 973 F.2d 911, 915 (1992).
207. Id. at 916.
208. Stern v. Tr. of Columbia Univ., 434 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct.
83 (2006).
209. Kimberly-Clark, 973 F.2d at 917.
210. For the requirement to work toward the common end, see supra notes 124-127 and text
accompanying text.
211. General Motors Corp. v. Toyota Motor Co., 467 F. Supp. 1142 (S.D. Ohio 1979), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, 667 F.2d 504 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 937 (1982), on remand, 569 F. Supp.
889 (S.D. Ohio 1983), aff’d, 738 F.2d 454 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (unpublished).
212. General Motors Corp., 667 F.2d at 507.
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collaborators.”213 The district court adopted the broad interpretation to
distinguish General Motors from Bass, which did not involve in-house
concerted projects, and to avoid obviousness challenges over
inventors’ own prior inventions by including all inventors involved in
the concerted projects in the inventive entity.
Subsequently, the 1984 Amendments introduced the common
ownership exception and eliminated the necessity of overcoming an
obviousness rejection under the common inventorship exception when
inventors worked for the same employer. Nevertheless, the Federal
Circuit adopted and further expanded the General Motors court’s
broad construction in interpreting the updated § 116 joint invention
statute even though the legislative history did not clearly show that
Congress intended to include multiple groups of individual inventors
engaging in serial in-house concerted projects as a single inventorship
entity.214 However, the court maintained that these inventors must still
meet the minimum collaboration requirement. For example, if an
inventor improved on a prior invention by another inventor without
any communication, under any common direction, or knowledge of
the prior art, the two inventors are not joint inventors 215even if they
work for the same employer and are thus under the aegis of one
employer.216 After the 1984 Amendment, the common ownership
exception enables the inventor to obtain patents on the improved
invention even if the invention is obvious over the prior invention.
The Federal Circuit’s attempt to develop an inclusive and openinnovation-friendly inventorship standard was exemplified in
Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc.217 The inventions at
dispute in Burroughs Wellcome included both the biopharmaceutical
drug known as azidothymidine (AZT) and the preparation of AZT, and
thus are considered inventions within the unpredictable arts. The
validity of the patents on the drug was challenged for failing to name
researchers at National Institute of Health (NIH) as inventors. Unlike
in General Motors, the NIH researchers and the named inventors were
employed by different business entities and had never worked under a
common direction. The NIH researchers joined the development of the
drug azidothymidine (“AZT”) only when they received a sample of
AZT from the patentee and tested it for the utility to treat patients
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Id.
2 CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 2, at § 2.02[2][a].
Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Distrib. Co., 973 F.2d 911, 917 (1992).
General Motors Corp., 667 F.2d at 507.
Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1229-30 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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infected with the human immunodeficiency virus (“HIV”). The court
did not examine whether named inventors and NIH researchers met
the collaboration requirement, although the court cited the principle
that a joint invention is the product of a collaboration to solve the
problem addressed.218 The NIH researchers did not work physically
together with the named inventors and did not work on a common
problem because the named inventor developed the drug
independently and NIH researchers only tested whether the invention
solved the problem. In determining that the NIH researchers were not
joint inventors, rather than failing to find collaboration, the court relied
on failure to contribute to the conception because the NIH researchers
joined the development after the named inventors’ conception of the
invention.219
In Dana-Farber, the Federal Circuit applied the broad joint
inventorship to include the U.S. and Japanese inventors who engaged
in serial projects in a single inventive entity. The Federal Circuit found
collaboration between the two groups based on multiple meetings,
joint authorship of scientific journal articles, collaboration agreements
and the sharing of experiment results and ideas.220 Here, unlike the inhouse developments in General Motors, U.S. and Japanese
researchers worked independently and thus never worked under a
common direction. Although the researchers worked toward a
common goal, development of a therapy or drug, they were unaware
of the problem being addressed, i.e., the therapeutic applications of
PD-1/PD-L1 to cancer treatments, until Dr. Freeman succeeded in
expressing PD-L1 in tumor cells. With the relaxed joint inventorship
standard used in Dana-Farber, any researchers (especially those in an
academic communities where open science is the norm) who are
willing to exchange research results and ideas are now subjected to a
risk of a joint inventorship dispute.
b. Inclusion of Reduction to Practice in
Finding Contribution
The Federal Circuit also expanded the inventorship concept by
including those who contributed to reduction to practice as joint
inventors. However, in doing so, the court preserved the fundamental
218. Id. at 1227.
219. Id. at 1231.
220. Dana-Farber Cancer Inst., Inc. v. Ono Pharm. Co., 379 F. Supp. 3d 53, 60 (D. Mass. 2019),
aff’d, 964 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
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principle of determining inventorship as developed by CCPA:
Conception is the touchstone in determining inventorship.221 The court
adopted the CCPA’s definition of conception, which is: “the formation
in the mind of the inventor, of a definite and permanent idea of the
complete and operative invention, as it is hereafter to be applied in
practice.”222 To establish conception, showing possession of every
element of an invention at the time of the alleged conception is
necessary.223 Regarding the necessary level of specificity, there must
be an idea in the inventor’s mind clear enough to enable an ordinary
person skilled in the art to reduce the invention to practice without
extensive research or experimentation.224 If a claim is directed to a
chemical substance, conception requires inventors to show possession
of both the chemical structure and an operative method of making it.225
Completion of conception functions as a gatekeeper, excluding
anyone who joined the collaboration with named inventors after the
conception of the invention.226 Contributions should qualify for
inventorship only if they were communicated to named inventors
before conception, as no one can contribute to the conception once the
conception is complete.227 In cases involving inventions in predictable
arts, the line between conception and reduction to practice is clear.
Courts reject inventorship if a putative joint inventor joined the named
inventors after conception of the invention because implementing
inventions in predictable arts does not require a significant skill, and
joint inventorship exclude those who simply exercised ordinary skills
to reduce the conception of the invention to practice.228 However, as
courts dealt more with inventorship disputes over inventions in the
unpredictable arts, the line between conception and reduction to
practice became blurred. This ultimately led to courts adopting a rule
to find joint inventorship for those who reduced the invention to
practice through experiments.
221. Burroughs Wellcome, 40 F.3d at 1228; Fina Oil & Chem. Co. v. Ewen, 123 F.3d 1466, 1473
(Fed. Cir. 1997). Both cases quoted Sewall v. Walters, 21 F.3d 411, 415 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
222. Coleman v. Dines, 754 F.2d 353, 359 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (quoting Gunter v. Stream, 573 F.2d 77
(C.C.P.A. 1978).) The Federal Circuit also cited Prof. Robinson’s treatise to support the definition.
Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
223. Coleman, 754 F.2d at 359; Davis v. Reddy, 620 F.2d 885, 889 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
224. Burroughs Wellcome, 40 F.3d at 1228; Sewall, 21 F.3d at 415.
225. Oka v. Youssef, 849 F.2d 581, 583-84 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
226. See supra text accompanying notes 217-19. In Burroughs Wellcome, the Federal Circuit
excluded NIH researchers from joint inventorship when they joined the research after the conception of
the invention, see also, University of Pittsburgh v. Hedrick, 573 F.3d 1290, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
227. 2 CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 2, at § 2.02[2][a].
228. Sewall v. Walters, 21 F.3d 411, 416 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Ethicon, Inc. v. United States Surgical
Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1460 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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This trend began in Amgen229 and Fiers v. Revel,230 both of which
involved priority disputes over patent claims directing to DNA
sequence encoding human proteins. These cases introduced the
doctrine of simultaneous conception and reduction to practice by
acknowledging that conception of some inventions in unpredictable
arts cannot be completed until the inventions are reduced to practice.231
For example, for DNA inventions, the Federal Circuit required
isolation of genes in order to establish conception.232 Burroughs
Wellcome, discussed above, cited Amgen and Fiers because that case
involved an invention in an unpredictable art, the biopharmaceutical
drug AZT, of which the utility was not certain until NIH researchers
tested a sample of it.233 In Burroughs Wellcome, the Federal Circuit
held that conception is complete even if inventors do not know
whether their invention actually works.234 The rationale for the holding
is that inventors’ actual knowledge of utility is part of reducing the
invention to practice.235 However, the Federal Circuit later clarified
that inventors must have knowledge of the utility with reasonable
certainty.236 Despite a showing of reasonable certainty, conception of
the invention should be retroactively negated when the following
reduction to practice reveals uncertainty through experimentation and
undermines “the specificity of the inventor’s idea that it is not yet a
definite and permanent reflection of the complete invention as it will
be used in practice.”237 Although the Federal Circuit acknowledged
exceptional instances where an inventor cannot establish a conception
until the invention is reduced to practice through experiments, the
court clarified that in these instances the conception was in fact
incomplete until reduction to practice because the only evidence of
conception was experimentation leading to a reduction to practice.238
Here, while trying to set a bright line between conception and
reduction to practice, the court actually expanded the scope of
inventorship in including those who only contributed to reduction to
229. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
230. Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
231. Amgen, Inc., 927 F.2d at 1206. For a general discussion of the doctrine of simultaneous
conception and reduction to practice, see 3A CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 103, at § 10.04[5]; Jackie
Hutter, A Definite and Permanent Idea—Invention in the Pharmaceutical and Chemical Sciences and the
Determination of Conception in Patent Law, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 687 (1995).
232. Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1169.
233. Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1229 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Hitzeman v. Rutter, 243 F.3d 1345, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
237. Burroughs Wellcome, 40 F.3d at 1229.
238. Id.
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practice by emphasizing that a person whose contribution is only
experimental can be a joint inventor if the person “contribute[s] to the
joint arrival at a definite and permanent idea of the invention as it will
be used in practice.”239
This trend of including post-conception contributions as a
contribution warranting joint inventorship was expanded to inventions
within predictable arts in Pannu v. Iolab Corp., in which a dispute over
the inventorship of an improved intraocular plastic lens was
involved.240 There, the Federal Circuit adopted a new inventorship
standard that includes those who contributed only to reduction to
practice of the invention as joint inventorship.241 The court neither
cited any authority nor included any discussions to support this new
standard, despite a clear conflict with its precedent rejecting joint
inventorship if an alleged joint inventor contributed only to reduce the
invention to practice.242 While Pannu is frequently cited to emphasize
the low threshold for contributions to qualify for joint inventorship,
the Federal Circuit has been reluctant to find joint inventorship based
solely on a contribution to reducing an invention to practice, due to
the conflict with the precedent in cases after the adoption of the new
standard.243 Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit’s recognition in Pannu
and Burroughs Wellcome of a contribution to reduction to practice as
sufficient for joint inventorship introduced substantial uncertainty as
to whether a person who contributed to post-conception activities is
qualified for joint inventorship.
While conception at least determines the finish line of the
inventive process, that line has become unclear by Federal Circuit
holdings.244 Additionally, the Federal Circuit does not set any line for
the starting point of the inventive process, however collaboration can
be used as objective evidence to identify that point. In other words,
any pre-conception contributions can qualify for joint inventorship
once inventors begin to collaborate. As highlighted in Dana Faber,
discoveries which should be distinct from the inventive process were
found sufficient for joint inventorship as long as those who made the
239. Id.
240. Pannu v. Iolab Corp., 155 F.3d 1344, 1345-46 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
241. Pannu, 155 F.3d at 1351.
242. See 2 CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 2, at § 2.02[2][d].
243. See StoneEagle Services, Inc. v. Gillman, 746 F.3d 1059, 1063 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (CAFC
continues to apply the pre-Pannu standard that “assistance in reducing an invention to practice generally
does not contribute to inventorship.”).
244. See Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1993), Burroughs Wellcome, 40 F.3d at 1223
(Fed. Cir. 1994).
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discoveries began to collaborate with inventors who applied the
discoveries to a therapeutic use and completed conception of an
invention.245 The court did not require a joint arrival to the conception
in addition to the discoveries as required in Burroughs Wellcome.246 In
other words, one who made discoveries is rewarded through an
inventive contribution by a joint inventor.
c. No Minimum Quantity and Quality of
Contribution
In Burroughs Wellcome, the Federal Circuit emphasized that
there is no minimum quality or quantity required for joint inventorship
under the post-1984 Amendment patent statute.247 In more recent
cases, the court held that a joint invention is simply the product of a
collaboration rather than a product of certain necessary degree of
quantity or quality of inventive contribution.248 Although the threshold
is low, one must “(1) contribute in some significant manner to the
conception or reduction to practice of the invention; (2) make a
contribution to the claimed invention that is not insignificant in
quality, when that contribution is measured against the dimension of
the full invention; and (3) do more than merely explain to the real
inventors well-known concepts and/or the current state of the art.”249
Even though explaining well-known concepts or the state of the
art is expressly excluded from sufficient contributions, the Federal
Circuit has given very little guidance in drawing a line between
“insignifican[t]” and “not insignifican[t]” contributions.250 Instead, the
court has refused to adopt any bright line rule, relying on the fact
specific nature of inventorship determination.251 However, the Federal
Circuit has given some guidance on what constitutes an insignificant
contribution by giving negative criteria. For example, one such
negative criteria holds that a contribution that is “far removed from the

245. See Dana-Farber Cancer Inst., Inc. v. Ono Pharm. Co., 964 F.3d 1365, 1370, (Fed. Cir. 2020).
Even contributions to discoveries of laws of nature qualified for joint inventorship.
246. Burroughs Wellcome, 40 F.3d at 1229. For more discussions about the case, see supra notes
217-219 –ؘand accompanying text.
247. Burroughs Wellcome, 40 F.3d at 1227.
248. E.g., Fina Oil & Chem. Co. v. Ewen, 123 F.3d 1466, 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Dana-Farber Cancer
Inst., Inc. v. Ono Phram. Co., 964 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
249. Pannu v. Iolab Corp., 155 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1998); In re VerHoef, 888 F.3d 1362, 1366
(Fed. Cir. 2018); Dana-Farber, 964 F.3d at 1371.
250. Aaron X. Fellmeth, Conception and Misconception in Join Inventorship, 2 N.Y.U. J. INTELL.
PROP. & ENT. L. 73, 105 (2012).
251. Vanderbilt Univ. v. ICOS Corp., 601 F.3d 1297, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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real-world realization” of an invention is insignificant.252 The
language used by the court focuses on the specificity or concreteness
of the ideas contributed to the conception rather than the gap for
converting contributions to the invention.253 Accordingly, a
contribution suggesting a desired result—without any means to
accomplish the result—does not meet the low threshold for joint
inventorship.254 In contrast, the Dana-Farber court found that the U.S.
researchers’ discoveries were significant contributions, even though
the discoveries were far removed from real world realization because
the researchers did not know how to apply the discoveries to the useful
end of cancer treatment.
The court frequently uses terms such as “inventive act” and
“inventive contribution,” which suggest the standards of patentability,
novelty and nonobviousness.255 However, the court clearly
distinguishes between the degree of public availability of the
information contributed for inventorship and the degree of public
availability of the prior art for novelty by requiring only the former to
be part of widely used products or well-known concepts.256 Even if a
prior invention by a putative joint inventor was publicly known at the
time the inventor communicated the improvement of the prior
invention to a named inventor of the invention, the inventor is a joint
inventor because he contributed his idea to improve the prior invention
and thus did more than merely provide well-known principles or
explain the state of the art.257
It is unclear whether Congress intended to require the inventive
nature in contribution after the 1984 Amendment because the original
version of the Amendments included the term “inventive contribution”
but the term was removed during the legislative process because
252. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Aradigm Corp., 376 F.3d 1352, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
253. Robert W. Harris, Conceptual Specificity as a Factor in Determination of Inventorship, 67 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 315 (1985).
254. Garrett Corp. v. United States, 422 F.2d 874, 881 (Ct. Cl. 1970); Nartron Corp. v. Schukra
U.S.A., Inc., 558 F.3d 1352, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Univ. of Cal. v. Synbiotics Corp., 29 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1463, 1467 (S.D. Calif. 1993).
255. Fina Oil & Chem. Co. v. Ewen, 123 F.3d 1466, 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“The basic exercise of
the normal skill expected of one skilled in the art, without an inventive act, also does not make one a joint
inventor.”).
256. Nartron Corp., 558 F.3d at 1357 (“[T]he contribution of the extender is insignificant when
measured against the full dimension of the invention of claim 11, not just because it was in the prior art,
but because it was part of existing automobile seats, and therefore including it as part of the claimed
invention was merely the basic exercise of ordinary skill in the art.”) (emphasis added); Caterpillar Inc.
v. Sturman Indus., Inc., 387 F.3d 1358, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[A] person will not be a co-inventor if he
or she does no more than explain to the real inventors concepts that are well known [in] the current state
of the art.”) (second alteration in original) (emphasis added).
257. Pannu v. Iolab Corp., 155 F.3d 1344, 1351; Nartron Corp., 558 F.3d at 1357.
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Congress was concerned that the term would introduce confusion
rather than clarification.258 However, there is a record in legislative
history suggesting that the term was removed to relax the quantity and
quality threshold developed by pre-1984 case law 259 Therefore, the
Federal Circuit has been using the term “inventive concept” but is
reluctant to examine the “significance” of contribution in light of
novelty and nonobviousness standards.
In Dana-Farber, the court made clear that novelty or
nonobviousness of the invention over contributions does not affect
joint inventorship.260 Moreover, the court refused to examine the
significance of contribution in light of the novelty of the invention at
the date of conception, holding that “collaborative enterprise is not
negated by a joint inventor disclosing ideas less than the total
invention to others, especially when, as here, the collaborators had
worked together for around one year prior to the disclosure, and the
disclosure occurred just a few weeks prior to conception.”261 The
Federal Circuit also properly rejected the argument that contributions
are insignificant when they were publicly available at the conception
date. Although the Federal Circuit has not squarely decided the timing,
the court suggested that the timing to examine significance of
contribution should be at contribution262 Unfortunately, the court
introduced further confusion regarding the timing in discussing the
public availability of the alleged contribution at the time of the
conception in a recent case.263 Inventors’ post contribution activities
should not affect the significance of their contributions. Otherwise,
researchers would be reluctant to communicate with each other and
this would harm collaborative research. This conflicts with the
Congressional intent in passing the 1984 Amendments and other
amendments which expand obviousness prior art exceptions.

258. Patent Law Improvements Act: Hearing on S. 1535 and S. 1841 Before the Subcomm. on
Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 31 (1984) reproduced
in Fasse, Muddy Metaphysics, supra note 2, at 180 n.160.
259. Id. The above Senate record includes a statement “even when a question exists as to whether
their contribution is an “inventive contribution,” which suggests that the inventive contribution was to be
relaxed or ignored.
260. Dana-Farber Cancer Inst., Inc. v. Ono Pharm. Co., 964 F.3d 1365, 1372.
261. Id.
262. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Aradigm Corp., 376 F.3d 1352, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (suggesting the
timing being at contribution by stating that “[c]ontributions to realizing an invention may not amount to
a contribution to conception if they merely explain what was ‘then state of the art’”). For a discussion of
timing, see Fellmeth, supra note 250, at 96 n.98.
263. Bio-Rad Labs. Inc. v. ITC, 996 F.3d 1302, 1320 (Fed Cir. 2021).
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Moreover, in focusing on the public availability of a contribution
on the conception date and/or the invention date, the argument
confuses the first-to-invent novelty with the statutory bar. As
discussed above, the public availability at the invention date is
irrelevant to the first-to-invent novelty.264 The public availability is
relevant to the statutory bar, but the timing to decide the public
availability is one year prior to the filing date. Instead of clarifying the
impact of post-contribution disclosure and the confusion over the firstto-invent novelty, the Federal Circuit has highlighted the period of
collaborative work to be “more than one year prior to the disclosure”
and the timing to be “only a few weeks prior to conception.” This
mislead inventors that a collaboration less than one year or a disclosure
of contribution more than a few weeks prior to conception may affect
joint inventorship.
III.

AIA: First-Inventor-To-File
A. The AIA First-Inventor-To-File Provision’s Unclear
Impact on Inventorship Standard

On September 16, 2012, AIA took effect following extensive
congressional debates over the proposal to adopt the first-to-file
system.265 One of the most controversial aspects of the AIA was the
replacement of the first-to-invent system with the first-inventor-to-file
(“FITF”) system. The FITF system adopted by the AIA is modeled
after the first-to-file systems for determining novelty and priority in
place in many other countries by the time the AIA was enacted.266
Given the widespread use of the first-to-file system, the controversy
over FITF’s inclusion in the AIA may seem strange. However, some
viewed FITF as unconstitutional because the Patent and Copyright
Clause guarantees an exclusive right to the first-to-invent inventors.267
264. For multiple types of secret prior art, see supra notes 138-145 and accompanying text.
265. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). The debate started
as early as 1966. See generally George E. Frost, The 1967 Patent Law Debate – First-to-Invent vs. Firstto-File, DUKE L. J. 923 (1967).
266. Some countries including Japan and Canada followed the first-to-invent system but abolished
because of the difficulty to determine the invention date and/or for harmonization with European
countries. For Japan, see TOSHIKO TAKENAKA ET AL., PATENT ENFORCEMENT IN THE U.S., GERMANY,
AND JAPAN, 19 (2015). For Canada, see Shih-tse Lo and Dhanoos Sutthiphisal, Does It Matter Who Has
the Right To Patent: First-To-Invent Or First-To-File? Lessons From Canada (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Res., Working Paper No. 14926, 2009), https://www.nber.org/papers/w14926 [https://perma.cc/38P99699].
267. Alexander J. Kasner, The Original Meaning of Constitutional Inventors: Resolving the
Unanswered Question of the Madstad Litigation, 68 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 24 (2015),
http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/wp-
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Others argued that the first-to-file system supported by large firms
would harm small firms and individual inventors who lack the
resources to consistently file patent applications early.268
To address these concerns, Congress adopted a modified version
of the first-to-file system, the FITF system. The FITF system that was
adopted maintains the focus on the first-to-invent inventor but differs
in how to decide who is the first-to-invent. The AIA made the filing
date relevant in determining priority over independently invented
patentably-indistinct inventions. In patent validity disputes, the AIA
removed the uncertainty of determining the invention date, which is
much more difficult to determine than the objectively determinative
filing date.269 To address the concern for inventors who cannot afford
to file patent applications as soon as inventions are complete, the AIA
introduced a system allowing inventors to rely on their own, earlier
disclosure date to establish the priority, so long as that disclosure date
was within the one year grace period.270
The impact of the FITF system on inventorship remains unclear
as the Federal Circuit has not examined any inventorship dispute over
post-AIA patents. As discussed, the pre-AIA inventorship standard
was intertwined with the first-to-invent novelty rule which permitted
multiple types of secret prior art. The current inclusive inventorship
standard was developed to overcome obstacles provided by such
secret prior art. Shifting to the FITF novelty rule, which excludes the
pre-AIA § 102(g) secret prior invention, may have a significant impact
on inventorship because courts developed the current inclusive
standard to provide effective patent protection for obvious inventions
resulting from cumulative process in light of the availability of secret
prior art. However, the AIA retained pre-AIA § 102(e), allowing a
prior invention described in a pending application to be used as prior
art.271 Moreover, it is unclear what role derived inventions play, if any,
as prior art under the AIA. On its face, the AIA eliminated § 102(f)
derived inventions from prior art because the AIA FITF novelty
provision does not provide any prior art equivalent to a derived
invention. Instead, the AIA introduced a derivation proceeding which
content/uploads/sites/3/2015/06/68_Stan_L_Rev_Online_24_Kasner.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6D8SX7S8].
268. Kent Hoover, Senate Passes Patent Reform Despite Small-Business Concerns, PHOENIX BUS.
J., March 18, 2011, https://www.bizjournals.com/phoenix/news/2011/03/18/senate-passes-patentreform.html [https://perma.cc/2VP8-8J2H].
269. H.R. Rep. No. 112-98 at 40 (2011); Takenaka, First-To-File, supra note 133, at 307.
270. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1)(B) (2012).
271. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) (2012).
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is used to provide remedies to the true inventor(s) of the derived
invention.272 Because the originality requirement originates from the
Constitution and should have survived AIA’s overhaul of the U.S.
patent system, derived inventions should continue to play a role to
ensure granting patents only to true inventors.
Moreover, Congress adopted new, undefined key terms to
outline when pre-filing disclosures can be removed as prior art under
AIA § 102(b).273 These new terms, combined with the unclear role
played by derived inventions, introduce ambiguity as to whether
derivation under the AIA prevents those who received ideas of less
than complete conception from claiming joint inventorship.
Legislative history strongly supports the removal of derived invention
from prior art and the adoption of the first-to-file policy, which would
significantly impact interpretation of the FIFT novelty provision.274
Nevertheless, courts may continue to apply the pre-AIA case law in
interpreting the definitions of prior art and its exceptions despite these
new terms.275
1.Originality Requirement: No Statutory Basis
Whether courts should retain the pre-AIA inclusive inventorship
standard may depend on the necessity of removing secret prior art for
obviousness rejections. However, it is unclear to what extent the AIA
removed that necessity. The AIA FITF novelty rule, § 102, provides
two types of prior art. The first type is a hybrid of pre-AIA §§ 102(a)
and (b), requiring public availability of the invention in the defined
prior art before the filing date of the claimed invention.276 The second
type is equivalent to pre-AIA § 102(e), requiring that the invention is
described in a patent application filed before the filing date of the
claimed invention.277 AIA § 102 does not include any terms connected
to the old first-to-invent standard (e.g., conception, reduction to
practice) and thus eliminates a prior, independent invention by another
as a basis of rejection (pre-AIA §102(g)). In contrast, while AIA § 102
does not include any prior art equivalent to pre-AIA § 102(f), it does
272. Donald S. Chisum, 3A CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 103, at § 10.10[4)[c].
273. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012).
274. Infra note 247 and accompanying text.
275. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 101 (2011) (“[W]here Congress uses a commonlaw term in a statute, we assume the ‘term . . . comes with a common law meaning, absent anything
pointing another way.’”).
276. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2012).
277. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) (2012).
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include the term “obtained” which is similar to the term “derived” used
in the language of pre-AIA § 102(f). This similar language is used in
the AIA in outlining the conditions by which an inventor can remove
disclosures from the prior art during the grace period.278 Accordingly,
the AIA eliminated from the novelty provision a ground to reject an
application or invalidate a patent for failure to meet the originality
requirement.279
Given the exclusion of this requirement from the novelty
provision, the U.S. Constitution requires that the AIA provide a
different basis for the originality requirement.280 Legislative history
indicates that pre-AIA § 102(f) was removed from AIA FITF prior art
because it was viewed as duplicative of § 101, with both provisions
embodying the originality requirement.281 Therefore, § 101 continues
to ensure that the first-to-file person is the true inventor, and provides
a grounds for rejection if that is not the case. This view, that § 101
provides a basis for rejection on originality grounds, is supported by
commentators.282 However, the Federal Circuit has not yet had a
chance to clarify the grounds for the originality requirement under the
AIA.
In refusing to process applications naming a machine as the
inventor, the USPTO cited § 101 in support of the interpretation that
an inventor does not include a machine under the AIA.283 However, in
the civil action reviewing the USPTO rejection, the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia upheld the USPTO rejection

278. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1)(2) (2012).
279. Donald S. Chisum, 3A CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 103, at § 10.10[4][b].
280. Id. Prof. (citing the AIA revision to the definitions of inventors, joint inventors and coinventor
as a basis for maintain the original requirement. 35 U.S.C. §§ 100(f) and (g). In addition, the AIA
continues to require inventors to execute an oath or declaration to confirm that they believe themselves
are the original inventor or joint inventors of a claimed invention. 35 U.S.C. § 100(f)).
281. Robert Armitage, Understanding the America Invents Act and Its Implications for Patenting, 40
AIPLA Q. J. 1, 97 (2012), https://patentlyo.com/media/docs/2012/10/armitage_pdf.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T3LG-F597]; Joseph D. Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America
Invents
Act:
Part
I
of
II,
21
FED.
CIR.
B.J.
435,
451
(2012),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/aia_implementation/guide-to-aia-p1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FJ77-ZVA3].
282. Joshua D. Sarnoff, Derivation and Prior Art Problems With the New Patent Act, 2011
PATENTLY-O L.J. 12 (2011), https://patentlyo.com/media/docs/2012/10/sarnoff.2011.derivation.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XK9D-89VQ]. The U.S.PTO also supports the view. Dennis Crouch, With 102(f)
Eliminated, Is Inventorship Now Codified In U.S.C. 101? Maybe But Not Restrictions on Patenting
Obvious
Variants
of
Derived
Information,
Patently-O
(October
4,
2012),
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2012/10/with-102f-eliminated-is-inventorship-now-codified-in-35-usc101.html [https://perma.cc/FS65-H968].
283. Decision on Pet., In re Application No. 16/524,350 (USPTO July 29, 2019),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/16524350_22apr2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/F47CA4Z4].
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without citing § 101.284 Instead, the court’s ruling focused on the
definitions of “inventor” and “joint inventor”285 as well as the
procedural requirements for inventors to file or authorize to file a
patent application,286 and the requirements to execute an oath and
declaration in connection with the application.287 The court cited a preAIA Federal Circuit case dealing with originality as support for the
ruling that an inventor must be a natural person because the mental act
of conceiving an invention is necessary to be qualified as an
inventor.288
If § 101 continues to act as the statutory basis for the
constitutional originality requirement, what will be the implications of
the AIA’s removal of derived inventions from the prior art? One
potential implication is that it will limit the scope of derived inventions
to prevent others from obtaining a patent where they modified the
ideas in prior art to create a complete, new invention. The legislative
history of the AIA supports this outcome, given the industry’s desire
to remove derived inventions as prior art for obviousness rejections.289
The Federal Circuit has interpreted any confidential communication
of a work as derived invention prior art and therefore rejected any
invention by inventors to whom the work was communicated if the
second invention was obvious over the communicated work.290
Accordingly, the AIA’s removal of derived inventions from the prior
art can be understood to result in a new originality requirement, which
prevents others from obtaining a patent on grounds of derivation only
if a fully conceived idea of the invention had been disclosed to a party
who then subsequently sought patents on that same invention.
However, it is unclear whether this new originality requirement
protects only those who communicated fully conceived ideas to others.
The AIA provides new remedies to those who provide such ideas,
including: (1) derivation proceedings, available where applications
claiming derived inventions are pending at USPTO;291 and (2) derived
patent lawsuit, available where patents are issued to derived

284. Thaler v. Hirshfeld, 583 F. Supp. 3d 238 (E.D. Va. 2021).
285. 35 U.S.C. §§ 100(f)-(g) (2012).
286. 35 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) (2012).
287. 35 U.S.C. § 115(b) (2012).
288. Univ. of Utah v. Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Forderung der Wissenschaften E.V., 734 F.3d
1315, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
289. Armitage, supra note 281, at 97.
290. OddzOn Prods. Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d 1396 (1997).
291. 35 U.S.C. § 135.
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inventions.292 Legislative history does provide support for pre-AIA
originality which used derived invention as prior art: Derivation
proceedings can be used to ensure that the originality requirement is
upheld for not only those who provided fully conceived ideas, but also
for those who provided less than fully conceived ideas in allowing
claims for joint inventorship.293 However, the USPTO continues to
apply the pre-AIA case law and requires both an early, complete
conception and communication of the conception in order to establish
derivation.294 Therefore, it is unclear whether the AIA completely
removed secret derived inventions from the prior art and thus it also
remains unclear whether the inclusive inventorship standard remains
necessary for protecting inventions resulting from cumulative
innovation.
2.FITF Novelty Rule: Unclear Underlying Policy
Another ambiguity in inventorship introduced by the AIA is an
unclear policy regarding the FITF novelty rule. The first-to-file system
provides a bright line novelty rule: Inventions publicly available
before the filing date forfeit their patent rights and thus are in the
public domain regardless of who invented the inventions.295 This
bright line rule ensures legal certainty and protects third parties who
practice and improve disclosed inventions for further innovation.296 If
the AIA adopted this bright line rule, the FITF novelty provision
should be read to eliminate not only pre-AIA § 102(g) prior
inventions, but also derived inventions (pre-AIA § 102(f)) and prior
inventions disclosed in a pending application (pre-AIA § 102(e)).
However, the AIA retained the availability of § 102(e) secret prior art
for use in novelty and nonobviousness rejections. As discussed, it is
unclear whether the removal of derived inventions resulted in a new
originality requirement under which derived invention prior art could
only be used for novelty rejections.297
292. 35 U.S.C. § 291; 35 U.S.C. § 135(c) (AIA authorizes the USPTO to deter a derivation
proceeding until termination of a post-grant review).
293. Armitage, supra note 281, at 98 n.384.
294. 77 Fed. Reg. 56075 (2012), Response to Comment 24.
295. E.g., EPC, art. 54.
296. Emmanuel Roucounas, The Debate Regarding the Grace Period in International Patent Law:
A Reminder, ALLEA Biennial Yearbook 2006, New Perspectives in Academia 31 (2006),
https://allea.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Roucounas_Debate_Grace_Period.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GHV9-4LDY]; [https://perma.cc/S425-7KPA]. Report from the Commission to the
European Parliament and Council, European Commission, at 16, SEC (2002) (Jan. 14,2002),
[https://perma.cc/S425-7KPA].
297. Supra notes 292–294 and accompanying text.
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However, it is clear that the AIA’s legislative history provides
support for the proposition that Congress adopted the first-to-file
system to define prior art under AIA § 102(a).298 Congress listed policy
justifications supporting the adoption of FITF novelty, including: (1)
to bring greater certainty in patent protection by awarding the priority
based on filing rather than invention dates, and (2) to harmonize the
U.S. patent system with EPC, which serves as a model for many
countries which adopt the first-to-file patent system.299 AIA §
102(a)(1) is analogous to EPC Article 54(2) in that it includes every
invention publicly available before the filing date as prior art.300
Additionally, AIA § 102(a)(2) is analogous to EPC Article 54(3) in
that it includes inventions disclosed in the content of patent
applications filed before the filing date as prior art.301 However, the
AIA does not limit the content of patent applications which is not
publicly available on the filing date of novelty applications.
Therefore, just like pre-AIA § 102(e), the content of such applications
constitutes secret prior art. This is a stark contrast to the EPC’s novelty
rule which uses the content of patent applications for novelty only—
in context of the priority—instead of as prior art.302 Therefore,
Congress’ adoption of the traditional first-to-file novelty rule was
incomplete in retaining pre-AIA § 102(e).
Moreover, the Supreme Court ignored legislative history which
clearly supports repealing the pre-AIA § 102(b) statutory bar and
adopting the overarching public accessibility standard to define prior
art.303 The Court interpreted “on sale” in AIA § 102(a)(1) as a statutory
bar which was unique to the policy underlying the first-to-invent
system and retained secret prior art.304 In Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v.
Teva Pharmaceuticals U.S.A, Inc., the Court applied pre-AIA § 102(b)
case law and found an on sale bar where the patentee had a purchase
agreement with a pharmaceutical company, even where the invention
298. Matal, supra note 281, at 452(“Both § 102(a)’s adoption of the e first-to-file system and its
modified definition of “prior art” were discussed extensively in the various committee reports and Senate
and House floor debates leading up to enactment of the America Invents Act.”).
299. H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, at S 291 (2011); 3A CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 103, at §
10.10[2][b].
300. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1).
301. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2).
302. For more discussion, infra note 308 and accompanying text.
303. Matal, supra note 281, at 450. See also Armitage, supra note 281, at 57 (“Hence, inventors and
their legal advisors should have great confidence that § 102(a)(1) under the AIA creates a transparent
definition for prior art based upon prior public disclosures made before the effective filing date of a
claimed invention, and, absent a disclosure made available to the public, there is no basis for any subject
matter qualifying as prior art under § 102(a)(1).”).
304. For the statutory bar policy, see supra notes 146-149 and accompanying text.
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was kept confidential.305 The Court ignored the language “otherwise
available in the public,” which was carefully selected by Congress to
apply the public access requirement to all means of disclosing
inventions listed in the AIA novelty provision.306 As a result, AIA §
102(a)(1) maintained the first-to-invent policy that the public
accessibility of an invention is irrelevant to qualifying as prior art.307
It is unclear which policies prevail in interpreting other parts of the
AIA novelty provision, which introduces uncertainty as to the extent
the Court wants to maintain secret prior art in order to promote early
publication. If the first-to-file policy prevails, as Congress aimed,
secret prior art should be removed completely because it is
inconsistent with the first-to-file novelty rule and unnecessary due to
the inherent incentive for inventors to file patent applications early.308
In contrast, the first-to-invent policy prevails with respect to AIA
§ 102(b) in providing exceptions to both types of prior art—publicly
available disclosures and disclosures in a pending patent application—
if such disclosures are made one year less than the filing date.309 The
period during which these exceptions apply is referred to as the “grace
period” in which pre-filing disclosures of inventions do not forfeit
their right to obtain a patent.310 AIA § 102(b) was structured to
resemble pre-AIA § 102(b) because circumstances for taking
advantage of the grace period are unlimited in that they include any
disclosures by inventors or a third party and that the removal of such
disclosures is automatic.311 The exceptions apply to both inventororiginated disclosures and independent third party disclosures.312
The broad scope of exceptions during the grace period under the
AIA is in stark contrast to the scope of exceptions during the grace
period under a first-to-file system such as the EPC. Although the AIA
was intended to harmonize U.S. patent law with the first-to-file model,
there remain many fundamental differences with respect to the scope
305. 139 S. Ct. 628 (2019).
306. Armitage, supra note 281, at 54.
307. See Takenaka, Rethinking, supra note 108, at 630.
308. Armitage, supra note 281, at 57.
309. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
310. Joseph Straus, Grace Period and the European and International Patent Law: Analysis of Key
Legal and Socio-Economic Aspects, 20 IIC STUDIES: STUDIES IN INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 1, 3
(Gerhard Schricker ed., 2001) (Under the first-to-file system, the grace period is limited to disclosures by
inventors and their successors. Prof. Straus defines grace period: “A specific period of time prior to the
filing of a patent application by the inventor or his or her successor in title, during which time disclosures
of an invention do not forfeit a right to patent the Invention.”),
311. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(2); Takenaka, Rethinking, supra note 108, at 631.
312. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(b)(1)(A)(B); 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(b)(2)(A) & (B).

126

CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP.

VOL 21:2

of grace-period exceptions. First, the EPC’s grace-period provision is
titled as “non-prejudicial disclosures” to clarify that the exception
does not apply to the first-to-file priority rule, and thus does not apply
to the disclosure of a pending application which supports a prior right
held by the first-to-file applicant.313 Second, the EPC grace period is
six months from the filing date instead of one year.314 Third, the scope
of the EPC grace period is very limited, covering only disclosures by
applicants or their legal predecessors where: (1) the disclosure was at
an international exhibition officially recognized to fall within the
conditions under the Paris Convention;315 and (2) the disclosure
resulted from an evident abuse by applicants and their legal
predecessors.316
The limited scope originates from the notion of “absolute
novelty.” In other words, there is historically a strong policy of
guaranteeing legal certainty by (a) protecting inventors from
inadvertently disclosing their inventions before filing a patent
application as doing so would result in forfeiture of their rights for a
patent, and (b) protecting third parties from infringement claims when
they believed that every disclosure without a corresponding patent
application was in the public domain and therefore used the disclosed
subject matter for further innovation.317 Thus, the EPO interprets the
evident abuse very narrowly to exclude even errors made by
governments.318
In most countries, no grace period is applicable to third-party
disclosure if the disclosed subject matter was independently
invented.319 For inventions which were rejected due to an independent
third-party pre-filing disclosure, the EPC member states provide a
prior user right which allows independent inventors and their
successors to continue to use their inventions under limited
circumstances.320 Lastly, the removal of pre-filing disclosure is not
313. EPC, art. 55. For more discussions of prior rights, see infra note 348 and accompanying text.
314. EPC, art. 55.
315. EPC, art. 55(1)(b); Paris Convention Art. 11.
316. EPC, art. 55(1)(a).
317. For the notion of absolute novelty and its underlying policy, see Straus, supra note 310, at 55–
64.
318. EPC, art. 55 (1); Unilever v. Bayer AG, T 0585/9, Board of Appeal of the European Patent
Office (1995) [https://perma.cc/FF8Y-4MJ4].
319. EUROPE ECONOMICS CHANCERY HOUSE, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE GRACE PERIOD 8, 86
(2014),
https://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/c4a001f6453f3d48c1257e0b0034cb2b/$FILE/
europe_economics_esab_grace_period_20112014_en.pdf.
320. EPC, art. 55 (limits either applicants or their legal predecessors to make disclosures. EPC
member states provide prior user rights to inventors who independently invented an invention that another
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automatic and requires a notification of the disclosure with evidence
at filing.321
In contrast, the scope of grace period exceptions under the AIA
covers any disclosure after the inventor’s first disclosure, even if that
disclosure does not originate from the inventor.322 Such disclosures
include both those that are publicly available before the filing date and
disclosures in a patent application pending at the USPTO before the
filing date.323 The broad scope of the grace period is ensured by the
text of FITF § 102(b), which provides two types of grace-period
exceptions being distinguished by inventorship.324 The first type of
grace-period exception covers inventor-originated disclosures which
is equivalent to the common inventorship exception and include
inventors’ own disclosures and third-party disclosures which obtained
the subject matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventors.
325
The second type of grace-period exception has no equivalent under
the Pre-AIA patent system and covers independent third-party
disclosures which were publicly disclosed after the inventors’ own
disclosure(s) or third-party disclosures originated from the inventors
covered by the first type of grace period.326
As the EPC only covers disclosures by inventors and applicants
to whom the inventors assigned their patent rights, the scope of the
first type of AIA grace-period exception, inventor-originated
disclosure, is broader than the EPC grace period. The second type of
AIA grace-period exception, independent third-party disclosure, is
unique to the U.S. system of FITF novelty in that it awards priority on
the publication date instead of the invention date (referred to as the
first-to-publish rule).327 During the congressional debate preceding the
AIA, first-to-file advocates called the second type the “first-topublish” grace period and emphasized strong protection for inventors
inventor patented under limited circumstances); U.S.PTO: PRIOR USER RIGHTS DEFENSE ( 2012)
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/aia_implementation/20120113-pur_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MMJ2-UH6Z] (U.S.PTO prepared a report on prior user rights in selected European
and Asian countries which adopted the first-to-file system).
321. EPC, art. 55 (2).
322. Matal, supra note 281, at 475.
323. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(A)(B).
324. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(b)(1) & (2).
325. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(b)(1)(A) & (b)(2)(A).
326. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(b)(1)(B) & (b)(2)(B).
327. Matal, supra note 281, at 480. E.g., PAUL JANICK, A COMMENTARY ON THE NEW PATENT LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES 887, GRUR Int. 2011; Brad Pedersen & Christian Hansen, Statutory Construction
and Policy Arguments for a Symmetric Approach to Promulgating Guidelines for New Section 102(b)
Subparagraphs (A) and (B)—the First-to-Publish Grace Period Exceptions to Prior Art, 4 CYBARIS
INTELL. PROP. L. REV., 102, 111–13 (2013).
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who failed to be the first-to-file.328 In adopting the second type of grace
period, Congress made the disclosure date relevant to patentability
even though the disclosure date must be determined with publicly
available evidence. Further, in adopting this grace period, Congress
limited the first-to-publish rule to within one year from the filing date,
even though the rule is contrary to the AIA’s goal of awarding priority
based on a filing date which can be objectively decided based on
patent office records.
In short, the public policy underlying the FITF standard of the
AIA is a blend of the first-to-file policy, advancing the goal of legal
certainty, and the first-to-invent policy, advancing the goal of equity
between first-to-file and first-to-invent inventors. For example, the
definition of prior art in § 102(a) increased the certainty of legal
outcomes, although the Supreme Court retained secret prior art which
introduces uncertainty in patentability. On the other hand, the graceperiod exceptions in § 102(b) protect inventors who are first-to-invent
but second-to-file, which introduces legal uncertainty by making
inventorship relevant to patentability regarding inventor-originated
disclosures and the public available date relevant to patentability
regarding third-party independent disclosures. The scope of
exceptions and the applicability of pre-AIA § (f) secret prior art
depends on how courts interpret the AIA’s prevailing policy between
the first-to-invent and the first-to-file.
If the first-to-file policy of legal certainty prevails, courts should
limit the scope of exceptions and prevent inventors who disclose their
inventions without patent applications from claiming an exception. If
inventors can claim an exception not only to the subject matter but
also a variation of the subject matter, the derivation proceeding may
function more like the pre-AIA interference which was expensive and
was intended to be eliminated by the adoption of the FITF policy.329
Unlike the originality requirement, which protects inventors who
confidentially communicated ideas to a third party, the AIA grace
period protects inventors who publicly communicated to a third party
when that third party discloses the invention or files a patent
application early. Courts must make a difficult decision to find the fine
balance between legal certainty and equity for first-to-publish
inventors. The USPTO’s first proposal of the grace period
examination rules gave more weight to legal certainty and required a
328. Matal, supra note 281, at 480.
329. Id. at 453.
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strict match of identity between the subject matter disclosed by the
inventors and the subject matter disclosed by the independent third
party.330 This rule was extensively criticized by commentators,
universities, and small businesses, who were major opponents of the
first-to-file system.331
In response to this criticism, the USPTO relaxed the identity
requirement by introducing some flexibility.332 Under the current rule,
the inventor’s first disclosure can, at least partially, remove any
intervening third-party disclosure even if the subject matter disclosed
in the third-party disclosure is a variant of the inventors’ disclosed
subject matter including an additional element.333 This flexibility
introduces complexity in examining genus and species disclosures: If
the subject matter of the inventor-originated disclosures is a species
and the subject matter of a third party intervening disclosure is a genus
(i.e., a description including a more generic disclosure of the species),
the third-party disclosure of the genus is removed from the prior art.
In contrast, if the inventor-originated disclosure of a genus, that
disclosure does not remove a third-party intervening disclosure of a
species and thus remains as prior art.334 The USPTO’s genus and
species examples suggest the anticipation (novelty) standard to
examine the subject matter disclosed by a third party and the inventor.
Further, using the term “obvious” in describing a variant of the
disclosed subject matter suggests the obviousness standard. Moreover,
the lack of guarantee that courts adopt the USPTO’s interpretation of
the grace-period provision further introduces considerable uncertainty
in patent protection.
330. According to the USPTO’s original proposal, a third-party intervening disclosure remains prior
art even if the differences between the subject matter in the inventors’ own disclosures and independent
third-party intervening disclosures are mere insubstantial changes, or only trivial or obvious variations.
Examination Guidelines for Implementing the First Inventor To File Provisions of the Leahy-Smith
America
Invents
Act,
77
Fed.
Reg.
11,059,
43,767
(Feb.
14,
2013),
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2013/02/14/2013-03450/examination-guidelines-forimplementing-the-first-inventor-to-file-provisions-of-the-leahy-smith [https://perma.cc/UK8L-2AQW].
This proposed rule effectively limited the grace period claims against independent third party intervening
disclosures. Eric P. Racite & Arpta Bhattacharyya, The Not-So-Amazing Grace Period Under the AIA,
CIPA J. (Sept. 2012), https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/articles/the-not-so-amazing-grace-periodunder-the-aia.html [https://perma.cc/T5L9-9WBY].
331. Jordan S. Joachim, Is the AIA the End of Grace? Examining the Effect of the America Invents
Act on the Patent Grace Period, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1293 (2015).
332. USPTO, MPEP 2153.02 Prior Art Exception under AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(2)(b) to AIA 35
U.S.C. § 102(a)(1), https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2153.html [https://perma.cc/3VP2EV74].
333. See id. If an inventor-originated disclosure discloses elements A, B, and C, and a third-party
intervening grace period disclosure discloses elements A, B, C, and D, the exception does not remove the
entire subject matter, but the element D remains to be cited as prior art. Id.
334. See id.
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B. Reinventing FITF Inventorship
As the AIA’s FITF novelty rule no longer functions to identify
first-to-invent inventors, the AIA could have adopted a simple
definition of the prior art that would include everything publicly
available before the filing date. Instead, the FITF rule maintained the
common inventorship exception both when finding a disclosure in a
pending application335 and when determining whether exceptions
apply.336 Thus, inventorship is relevant to patentability and the muddy
inventorship standard remains, introducing uncertainty in post-AIA
patents. In addition, the difficulty of protecting inventions resulting
from the cumulative innovation process remained due to the
incomplete elimination of secret prior art. Until the Federal Circuit
provides clarification, the originality standard and the scope of derived
inventions as prior art will remain uncertain. With the prevalent
uncertainty on secret prior art pre-AIA, the AIA expanded the scope
of the common ownership exception337 and the joint research
agreement exception.338
As a result of these expansions, a legal commentator observed
the current FITF provision as a “complex and haphazardly developed
statutory framework.”339 However, with the proper implementation of
the first-to-file policy, the AIA can be simplified by removing the
inventorship distinction and the availability of secret prior art. With
complete removal of secret prior art, the multiple and overlapping
layers of exceptions to obviousness prior art currently in place would
no longer be necessary. Moreover, such removal eliminates the need
to keep the current inclusive inventorship standard in order to protect
obvious inventions using the common inventorship exception.
Therefore, the following section proposes reinventing the inventorship
standard to revitalize the collaboration and inventive contribution
requirements to protect inventors from the risk of inventorship and
ensures the reward of those who made inventive contributions.
1.Simplified Statutory Framework
The USPTO is planning to revise its terminal disclaimer rules to
permit a party to a joint research agreement to overcome obvious-type
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.

See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2).
See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1)(A); 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(2)(A).
See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(2)(C).
See 35 U.S.C. § 102(c).
Motomura, supra note 150, at 603.
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double patenting. The current scheme to obtain patents on obvious
inventions is very complex because of the multiple, overlapping
exceptions. Even if one of those exceptions prevents an obviousness
rejection, the USPTO rejects the claimed invention for obvious-type
double patenting if the claimed invention is obvious over the prior
invention. To overcome that rejection, the patent owner must file a
terminal disclaimer to give up some of the term of the second patent
so that the first and second patents expire at the same time. 340 The
disclaimer must include a provision promising to enforce the two
patents only during the period when they are commonly owned.341 If
the first and second patents issue to different parties, the disclaimer
must include a provision waiving the rights to separately enforce these
patents.342 Since the USPTO’s current rules only allow parties to a
joint research agreement to file a terminal disclaimer and overcome an
obvious-type double patenting rejection under limited circumstances,
the proposed rules will relax this limitation so more parties can take
advantage of terminal disclaimers.343 In short, under the current
complex statutory framework, an inventor needs to find a basis for
removing a disclosure in a pending patent application cited for
obviousness even if the invention described in the disclosure resulted
from the research project in which the inventor participates. If the
common ownership and joint research agreement exceptions do not
apply, an inventor needs to rely on the common inventorship
exception which is controlled by the muddy inventorship standard. In
all cases where an exception applies, inventors need to file a terminal
disclaimer.
What Congress aimed to accomplish through the current
complex scheme can instead be accomplished by simply limiting the
availability of a disclosure in a pending application to novelty grounds
only. The common inventorship exception is not necessary if such
disclosures are excluded from obviousness prior art regardless of
disclosure’s origin, as is the case under the EPC.344 A traditional firstto-file patent system excludes such disclosures for obviousness or
inventive step prior art because the disclosure of a pending patent
application is not publicly available before the filing date and will be
340. See 35 U.S.C. § 253. For a discussion of obvious-type double patenting, see 3A CHISUM ON
PATENTS, supra note 103, at § 9.03.
341. See 37 C.F.R. 1.321(c)
342. See 37 C.F.R. 1.321(d).
343. See USPTO, 37 C.F.R. Part 1, Disclaimer Practice in Patents and Patent Application, 85 Fed.
Reg. 86518 (Dec. 30, 2020).
344. EPC, art. 54.
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available only when the application matures into a patent or is
published eighteen months after the filing date.345 Thus, the AIA
should have included the same limitation—allowing use of the
disclosure in a pending patent application for novelty purposes only—
when Congress adopted the overarching public availability
requirement for prior art.346 The adoption of a requirement removing
secret prior art should have resulted in the repeal of the doctrine that
the Supreme Court had developed permitting the disclosure as secret
prior art as of the filing date for novelty and obviousness.347
The public availability requirement adopted by Congress should
have converted the subject matter disclosed as filed in a pending patent
application from pre-AIA prior art into a prior right, with the first-tofile priority on the filing date as the same disclosure giving the prior
right.348 The effect of prior art is to prevent the subject matter disclosed
in a patent application with a later filing date from obtaining a patent
under the first-to-file system349 Because the disclosure only supports
the first-to-file priority, it cannot be cited to defeat inventive step.350
Limiting such disclosures to novelty only is supported by not only
legal theory under the first-to-file system, but also by first-to-invent
public policy because the limitation protects inventors who
independently made obvious inventions but were unable to file early
enough to be the first-to-file.351
More than two decades prior to the enactment of AIA, Congress
addressed the question whether to limit pre-AIA § 102(e) prior art for
novelty only.352 However, the AIA’s legislative history does not
include any discussion about this limitation during the extensive
debates over the adoption of the FITF novelty rule.353 By failing to
introduce the limitation, Congress left at least one type of secret prior
345. E.g., EPC, art. 56.
346. For the overarching public access requirement, see supra note 303 and accompanying text.
347. See Alexander Milburn Co. v. Davis Bournonville Co., 270 U.S. 390 (1926) (explaining the
Supreme Court made the disclosure in a pending application available as prior art on the filing date);
Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Brenner, 382 U.S. 252, 256 (1965) (extending the reasoning of Milburn to
make the disclosure available prior art for obviousness).
348. European Patent Guide, 3.3. 003, https://www.epo.org/applying/european/Guide-forapplicants/html/e/ga_c3_3_2.html [https://perma.cc/3K8Q-RFUP].
349. For a discussion of prior rights, see Reinhard Wieczoreck, Convention Applications as PatentDefeating Prior Rights, 6 I.I.C. 135 (1975).
350. EPC, art. 56.
351. Thomas, supra note 138.
352. See id., at 165. The Advisory Commission on Patent Law Reform recommended to make the
disclosure of a pending application to be prior art for novelty only.
353. See Armitage, supra note 281, at 61 (explaining a drafter of industry representative expected
the substantive change from pre-AIA § 102(e) minimum).
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art, despite the industry’s need to remove all types of secret prior art,
resulting in a serious threat to the validity of post-AIA patents.354 In
short, § 102(a)(2) should be revised to limit the secret disclosure in a
pending application to prior art for the purpose of novelty rejection
only and remove the common inventorship exception. Section
102(b)(2) should be revised to remove the common inventorship
exception for inventor-originated inventions in § 102(b)(2)(A) and the
common ownership exception in § 102(b)(2)(C). In addition, the joint
research agreement exception outlined by § 102(c) should be also
removed.
In fact, inventors have already somewhat attained the benefit of
the novelty limitation under the current complex statutory framework.
If it is likely that a prior invention by another inventor of the same
project who works for a different employer will be cited for
obviousness and an application for the invention has already filed, the
inventor or her employer can either purchase the application or
execute a joint research agreement before filing an application for the
likely obvious invention. If an application has already been filed for
the likely obvious invention, inventors in the same research project
can change inventorship of both applications to take advantage of the
common inventorship exception.355 Under the inclusive inventorship
standard, inventors who engage in the same research project can
readily qualify for joint inventorship. By excluding the pending
application disclosure from obviousness prior art, inventors, their
employers, and the USPTO can reduce the administrative burden and
reduce the legal uncertainty in patentability and validity.
Even with the removal of these multiple exceptions regarding
secret disclosures in pending applications, patentability still depends
on the muddy inventorship standard because the common inventorship
exception requiring the disclosure originating from the inventor allows
the removal of publicly available disclosures otherwise permitted by
§ 102(a)(1) during the grace period.356 The common inventorship
exception is also relevant to the first-to-publish grace period because
an inventor-originated disclosure under § 102(b)(1)(A) establishes the
first-to-publish priority.357 Moreover, as discussed above, the
354. Armitage, supra note 281, at 4; Matal, supra note 281, at 474.
355. Michael K. Henry, How to Avoid Your Own Patents and Applications as Prior Art Under the
America Invents Act (AIA), HENRY PATENT L. FIRM (Oct. 19, 2017), https://henry.law/blog/prior-artunder-aia [https://perma.cc/98D9-U2ZS].
356. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1)(A).
357. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1)(B).
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uncertainty of the scope of the grace-period exception (i.e., whether
the exception applies to obvious variants of the disclosed subject
matter) introduces further uncertainty in patentability.358
Adoption of the same, novelty-only limitation on the publicly
available disclosure exception in § 102(b)(1) can address the academic
community’s concerns while keeping the first-to-publish priority
disputes through the derivation proceedings to a minimum. The
limitation should apply to the disclosure regardless of its origin. Under
the first-to-file novelty rule, if a third party disclosed an obvious
variation of the subject matter of a pre-filing disclosure by a first-topublish inventor, the first-to-publish inventor’s prefiling disclosure is
prior art against the second-to-publish third party inventor and the
second-to-publish third-party inventor’s disclosure is prior art against
the first-to-publish inventor. Thus, neither party can obtain a patent
regardless of the origin of the invention. Instead, the AIA should
award patents to both first-to-publish inventor and second-to-publish
third party inventor for obvious inventions in order to promote early
disclosures during the grace period while keeping the first-to-file
priority rule. While those who disclose their invention early should be
awarded patents, so too should inventors who made obvious
inventions based on the subject matter in pre-filing disclosures, as this
would incentivize first-to-publish inventors early filing in that a prefiling disclosure results in the risk of patent on obvious inventions by
a third party.359 The novelty-only limitation would also protect a third
party who independently invented an obvious invention.360
In other words, the availability of the publicly available
disclosures in § 102(a)(1) during the grace period should be also
limited to novelty prior art only. However, excluding the disclosures
in a pending application and publicly available disclosures during the
grace period from obviousness prior art will often result in obvioustype double patenting. Thus, patent applicants and owners will need
to file a terminal disclaimer to overcome the double patenting rejection
or invalidity challenges as is the case for the common inventorship,
ownership and joint research agreement exceptions under current
practice.361 Otherwise, both parties should be barred from obtaining a
patent or being invalidated if patents have already issued, which gives
both parties enough incentives to work on a terminal disclaimer. As a
358.
359.
360.
361.

See supra notes 329–334 and accompanying text.
See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1)(A).
See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1)(B).
See supra notes 340-343, and accompanying text.
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result, the statutory framework will be substantially simplified, and
patentability will be free from the legal uncertainty resulting from the
muddy inventorship standard.
2.Collaboration Requirement
Once the simplified statutory framework removes the necessity
for the current overinclusive inventorship standard, the Federal Circuit
should revitalize the collaboration requirement for joint inventorship.
Dana-Farber and many other recent Federal Circuit cases have made
the collaboration requirement ineffective in protecting researchers
from the risk of inventorship disputes and have also introduced
uncertainty in patent protection by making derivation
indistinguishable from joint invention. The court repeatedly
emphasizes the requirement of collaboration or concerted effort, but
the requirement is met simply if inventors have some communication
during or in temporal proximity.362 Even one meeting in which use of
a material is suggested may satisfy the collaboration requirement if
that material is adopted by a named inventor and appears in the
claimed invention.363
The risk of inventorship disputes resulting from the current
ineffective collaboration requirement is particularly high in the
biopharmaceutical industry because researchers frequently meet at
science conferences and exchange ideas and data. However, they do
not work jointly to solve a problem because the problem that
researchers should address is unknown until they determine the utility
of their discoveries.364 Researchers from different stakeholders work
independently and competitively rather than concertedly under a
single direction.
Dana-Farber represents these unique features of the innovation
process in the biopharmaceutical industry. Drs. Wood, Freeman and
Dr. Honjo worked independently, and thus Drs. Wood and Freeman
did not know of the final claimed invention conceived by Dr. Honjo.
Even without a collective effort or joint arrival at the conception due
to lack of communication, the district court found there was
collaboration of the three researchers.365 This ruling is contrary to the
362. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Aradigm Corp., 376 F.3d 1352, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
363. See Pannu v. Iolab Corp., 155 F.3d 1344, 1346.
364. This problem is highlighted in the real-life example in Dana-Farber. See supra note 128 and
accompanying text.
365. See Dana-Farber, 379 F. Supp. 3d at 89.
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precedent of Vanderbilt Univ. v. Icos Corp. which was cited by the
district court to find collaboration despite the joint inventors’ failure
to recognize the completed conception. In Vanderbilt, the Federal
Circuit required collective efforts to conception, emphasizing that
each co-inventor must engage with the other co-inventors to contribute
to a joint conception.366 Such active intellectual collaboration was
lacking among Drs. Honjo, Wood and Freeman. Instead, they arrived
at the conception of the inventions separately and independently and
thus fought over who was the first to complete the conception of the
cancer treatment by blocking the pathway.367 The inventorship dispute
over the 1999 provisional application also supports their relationship
as being competitive for patents instead of collaborative,368 similar to
the relationship between the two groups of researchers that the Federal
Circuit denied joint inventorship in American Bio Science.369
Unfortunately, Dana-Farber inadvertently eliminated the requirement
of collective effort to the conception, instead inserting a presumption
of collaboration even when every inventor did not have knowledge of
the complete conception of the invention.
3.Inventive Contribution
The Federal Circuit should give a definition to “inventive
contribution” that would exclude contributions that are unrelated to
the inventive aspect or inventive concept of the claimed invention.
With the Federal Circuit’s repeated emphasis on the modicum
threshold that there is no bottom-line quantum or quality requirement
for contribution, any contribution is significant and sufficient for joint
inventorship except for very clear cases involving no intellectual
contributions (e.g., simply following named inventors’ instructions or
merely explaining a well-known concept or the current state of the
art).370 Even a contribution to a small element—which appeared in
only two of the fifty-five claims included in the disputed patent—was
found to be a sufficient contribution despite that contribution being
measured against the dimension of the full invention.371 As a result,
this too-easy-to-pass standard cannot function to exclude
contributions without any inventive nature and therefore awards joint
366. See Vanderbilt Univ., 601 F.3d at 1303.
367. See Dana-Farber, 379 F. Supp. 3d at 94.
368. See Dana-Farber, 379 F. Supp. 3d at 74.
369. See Bd. of Educ. ex rel. Bd. of Trustees of Fla. State Univ. v. Am. BioScience Inc., 333 F.3d
1330 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
370. E.g., Dana-Farber, 964 F.3d at 1371; Pannu, 155 F.3d at 1351.
371. Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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inventorship to those whose collective contributions have no relevance
to inventions.
Today’s non-inventive contribution standard resulted from the
Federal Circuit’s adoption of a procedural framework to examine joint
inventorship claims: First, this framework requires (1) the
interpretation of claims to determine the subject matter covered by the
claim and (2) comparison of the subject matter with the alleged
contribution.372 When courts find that the alleged “contribution’s role
appear in the claimed invention”373 or found its way into the defined
invention in a claim,374the inventor contributed to the conception of
the claimed invention and thus a joint inventor. After Dana-Farber,
such contributions do not need to appear explicitly in the claim in
order to qualify as a significant contribution.375 As a result, the current
standard cannot function to exclude contributions without any
inventive nature.
Just as a sole inventor must make an invention which has an
inventive aspect to produce an advanced result over the prior art, joint
inventors must collectively contribute to the inventive aspect of the
invention. In Sewall v. Walters, one of the rare cases where
contributions were found insignificant, the Federal Circuit required
that the alleged contribution must be made to the inventive aspect of
the claimed invention, not just any aspect of such invention.376 The
court identified an element in the claimed invention as the inventive
aspect because adding the element in the prior art apparatus resulted
in surprising and unexpected results at the time of invention.377
Because the AIA made the filing date relevant to patentability, the
inventive aspect must be determined as of the filing date.
The term “inventive aspect or feature” is used more frequently
in cases applying the doctrine of patent exhaustion than inventorship.
In Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc.,the Supreme Court uses
the term “inventive aspect” and “essential features” alternatively and
ruled that a patent is exhausted if an uncompleted article embodying
the inventive aspect of the patent is sold by the patent owner.378 The
372. Trovan, Ltd. v. Sokymat SA, 299 F.3d 1292, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
373. Ethicon, Inc., 135 F.3d at 1462.
374. Ethicon, Inc., 135 F.3d at 1463.
375. Dana-Farber, 964 F.3d at 1373.
376. Sewall v. Walters, 21 F.3d 411, 416 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
377. Id. at 416–417.
378. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 632 (2008) (citing United States v.
Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 250–251 (U.S. 1942)).
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Court also distinguished inventive and non-inventive aspects by
asking whether the aspect is necessary to practice the patent or the
aspect is common step or element.379 The Federal Circuit further
clarified that the inventive aspect should be uncommon and essential
to produce the advantage of the invention.380 The court also uses the
term “inventive aspect” to identify novel features distinct from prior
art features in examining nonobviousness of improvement
inventions.381 Applying these definitions of “inventive” to “inventive
contribution” demonstrates that the non-insignificant requirement
should exclude contributions to the common feature which are not
essential for practicing the claimed invention’s advantage over the
prior art.
Moreover, inventive contributions should exclude contributions
to discoveries of a law of nature and natural phenomena. Such
discoveries have no inventive aspect until the inventive concept
converts them into inventions “significantly more” than the ineligible
discoveries.382 Even if a contribution to a discovery is scientifically
significant and provides fundamental building blocks for conception
of the invention, such contribution is not inventive contribution unless
the contribution is made to the inventive concept by applying such
discoveries to a useful result. Therefore, contributions to discoveries
by Drs. Wood and Freeman should not have been found significant to
the conception of the invention. Even a discovery which Dr. Freeman
made before he met Dr. Honjo was included as an inventive
contribution once Dr. Wood connected the discovery to PD-1 as its
ligand. Thus, the Federal Circuit’s standard has no limit to the extent
that an inventive contribution is found retroactively from the
conception of the invention. Instead, the district court should have
focused on whether the U.S. researchers collectively and jointly
contributed to applying the discoveries to a useful end, which in this
case was applying the discovery of the inhibitive function of PD-1/PDL1 pathway to the treatment.
To exclude contribution without inventive nature, the procedural
framework should incorporate an additional step identifying the
inventive aspect of the claimed invention. For inventions in the
biopharmaceutical industry, this step should exclude pre-invention
379. Quanta, 553 U.S. at 633–34.
380. LifeScan Scot., Ltd. v. Shasta Techs., LLC, 734 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
381. E.g., Fox Factory, Inc. v. SRAM, LLC, 944 F.3d 1366, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2019); Ethicon EndoSurgery, Inc. v. Covidien LP, 812 F.3d 1023, 1035 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
382. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 566 U.S. at 72–73.
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contributions which do not include inventive concept, namely
discoveries of a law of nature and natural phenomena. In short, courts
should find joint inventorship only if the alleged contribution appears
or plays a role in the inventive aspect of the claimed invention. Even
if this requirement is met, the alleged contribution is not inventive and
should not be qualified for inventorship if the contribution is a
discovery and does not include an inventive concept. Therefore,
individuals are joint inventors only if they collectively make an
inventive contribution to the conception. It is essential that all
individuals must join their efforts to constitute an inventive entity
independent from respective individual joint inventors. As a result,
each individual does not need to make an inventive contribution for
joint inventorship unless the contribution is a mere explanation of
well-known principles or the current state of art. However, they must
meet the revitalized collaboration requirement through a joint effort to
reach the conception.
Finally, it is important that the Federal Circuit clarify that the
timing to examine the significance of a respective individual’s
contribution is at the time of contribution.383 If the contribution was
significant at the time that it was communicated to other joint
inventors, post-contribution activities such as disclosure should not
affect the significance of contribution. Otherwise, joint inventors
would be discouraged from disclosing their discoveries and
inventions.
CONCLUSION

Ultimately, it was the notoriously muddy inventorship standard
under Federal Circuit case law that led to a bitter fight between the
Nobel prize winner and the top scientists at a world-renowned research
institute and a leading biotech firm. All researchers who conduct
research in the biopharmaceutical industry and practice open science
are at risk of similar inventorship disputes if they develop drugs and
therapies which will bring a big profit to their employers. Because the
U.S. legacy of first-to-invent policies influenced the development of
the current inventorship standard, it is likely that the inventorship
standards in the rest of the world are different and may provide more
efficient protection to researchers. Such a difference in standards
presents challenges to international research teams and their
employers who obtain and enforce patents globally. With reform
383. Supra notes 90 and 263 and accompanying texts.
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removing secret prior art completely, the inventorship standard would
no longer be muddy and overinclusive. The standard should be
reinvented to reward only those who made inventive contributions,
which will greatly contribute to the harmonization of patent systems
in the rest of the world.

